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WMD terrorism is a new concern. The United States is preparing for the
possibility of terrorist acts involving chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, but the
scope of these preparations is too narrow. This thesis argues that radiological devices are
also viable weapons ofmass destruction for terrorism. Radiological weapons are not
nuclear explosives; they are designed to disperse radioactive material over an area by
mechanical means or conventional explosives. The potential for radiological terrorism
depends upon access to the required nuclear materials and the motivations for terrorists to
use radiological weapons. Radiological weapons can use non-weapons grade nuclear
material which is widely accessible throughout the world. The material is under a
spectrum of physical security systems with little accountability and verification.
Radiological weapons can further terrorist objectives because they can be used to
contaminate individuals without producing the immediate and widespread catastrophic
damage normally associated with WMD. This prospect of contamination is enough to
incite the public's fear of the nuclear unknown or nuclear phobia. To counter radiological
terrorism, the U.S. government should expand indications and warning through efforts to
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The March 1995 Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas attack in Japan set the precedent for
the successful use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by a sub-state actor. The
placing of cesium-137 by Chechen separatists in Izmailovsky Park, Moscow on 23
November 1995 was the first widely publicized act of radiological terrorism. Future cases
ofWMD terrorism can not be discounted.
The United States is preparing for the possibility of terrorist acts involving
chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. However, focusing solely on those weapons as
the primary weapons for WMD terrorism is too narrow. This thesis argues that
radiological devices are viable weapons ofmass destruction for terrorism. The potential
for radiological terrorism depends upon access to the required nuclear materials and the
motivations for terrorists to use radiological weapons.
Radiological weapons can use non-weapons grade nuclear material which is widely
accessible throughout the world. Numerous industries use a wide range of radionuclides
in their day to day operations. These radionuclides are under a spectrum of physical
security systems with little or no transparency for accountability and verification.
Inadequate security and lack of transparency in radionuclide industries create a path of
least resistance whereby nuclear material can be obtained by theft or diversion.
Furthermore, all of the required technical knowledge for acquisition and production of
radiological weapons is available through open sources.
xv
The utility of radiological weapons is based on the technical aspects of
radionuclides and the psychological aspects of nuclear phobia. Radiological weapons can
contaminate individuals with either a dose equal to or greater than the annual permissible
dose allowed by U.S. law without producing the immediate and widespread catastrophic
damage normally associated with WMD. This contamination is enough for terrorists to
tap into the public's fear of the unknown and to trigger the nuclear fear that is well
established in many societies throughout the world. Nuclear fear and the general risk of
cancer give credibility to the psychological aspect of radiological weapons.
Radiological weapons can be superb psychological terror weapons. The weapons
allow terrorist organizations to operate on the threshold that separates acts of violence
from being ineffective in attaining their goals and from being overly devastating so that
internal and external support for their cause is lost. The radiological terrorism threat can
be diminished by undermining the psychological aspects of radiological weapons. Once
the fear is gone, risk perception will decrease, and the foundations of nuclear phobia will
crumble.
Present U.S. resources can be best employed against radiological terrorism by
expanding indications and warning, maximizing the intelligence community's human
intelligence assets, and accessing and exploiting open source collection. The DCFs
Nonproliferation Center can show policy makers that radiological weapons can not be
dismissed. The inability to prepare for new threats may leave the United States
vulnerable to those threats.
xvi
I. INTRODUCTION
The RAND Chronology of International Terrorism has recorded fifty-two
attempted terrorist attacks using weapons of mass destruction (WMD) since 1968. ' The
fifty-two incidents range from "plotting such attacks, attempting to use chemical or
biological agents or to steal, or otherwise fabricate on their own nuclear devices."2 These
previous attempts at WMD terrorism illustrate the fact that some terrorist organizations
are willing to escalate to WMD in order to draw more attention to their cause.
Two recent events exemplify the world's vulnerability to WMD terrorism: the
March 1995 sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway and the box of cesium- 137 found on 23
November 1995 in Izmailovsky Park, Moscow. The Aum Shinrikyo gas attack in Japan
set the precedent for the successful use ofWMD by sub-state actors. The placing of
cesium- 137 by Chechen separatists in Izmailovsky Park was the first widely publicized
act of radiological terrorism.
Terrorist acts have become increasingly more violent over the past few decades. 3
As terrorists turn to increasingly more lethal methods to gain notoriety, radiological
weapons may be the terrorist's next choice. Radiological weapons are the niche between
conventional explosives and true WMD.
1
Bruce Hoffman, Terrorist Targeting: Tactics. Trends, and Potentialities, P-7801 (Santa Monica: RAND,
1992), 3.
2
Bruce Hoffman, Responding to Terrorism Across the Technological Spectrum (Carlisle Barracks:
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 15 July 1994), 3.
3
Hoffman, Terrorist Targeting. 3-10.
A. DEFINITION OF RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
Radiological weapons are devices designed to disperse radioactive material over an
area by mechanical means or conventional explosives. 4 Radiological terrorism includes
sabotage attacks against nuclear power reactors and attacks against nuclear waste storage
tanks. Attacks against nuclear facilities would be an attempt to produce contamination on
the scale of the Chernobyl accident.
Radiological weapons are considered WMD because they contain nuclear material.
These weapons produce neither the blast effects or the extreme temperatures associated
with nuclear weapons, nor the immediate catastrophic deaths normally associated with
chemical and biological weapons. The intended results of a radiological weapon can be
any combination of the following: psychological, public panic, disruption, radioactive
contamination, or hazardous health conditions.
B. NATURE OF THEPROBLEM
Terrorist organizations need the media to spread their propaganda and reach their
target audience. Acts ofviolence are required to gain media coverage. Over the past few
decades developing trends indicate that conventional acts of terrorism are increasingly
more violent. The next step from conventional methods may be WMD.
The terms radiological weapon and radiation dispersal device have been used interchangeably since the
early 1970's. This thesis refers to all devices using radioactive nuclear material, with the exception of
strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, as radiological weapons.
The March 1995 Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas attacks confirms that conventional
terrorism has crossed the threshold to WMD terrorism. This is not to say that every act
of terrorism will be WMD terrorism. The majority of terrorists acts will continue to be
carried out with conventional methods until these tactics become routine; whereby the
next step in innovation may lead to WMD. The highly publicized acts of Aum Shinrikyo
and the Chechen separatists have spread the idea ofWMD terrorism throughout the
world. Terrorist organizations desiring to use WMD will study past acts ofWMD
terrorism and improve future dispersal scenarios.
The United States is committed to deterring and countering WMD terrorism.
Extensive research and analysis has been conducted by U.S. government agencies and non-
government organizations. TheWMD focus is on nuclear, chemical , and biological
weapons. These weapons can cause immediate, wide spread death and destruction. This
is a legitimate focus. As a nation-state we are concerned with protecting our society from
threats. The greatest threats come from WMD. Therefore it is logical to put the greatest
amount of U.S. resources and analysis on true WMD. This means that radiological
weapons, which can not cause immediate, widespread death and destruction, have become
low priority threats.
C. ARGUMENT
Current U.S. WMD policy is too narrow and underestimates radiological
weapons. Radiological devices are viable weapons for WMD terrorism. If the U.S.
intelligence community and policy makers fail to understand the implications of
radiological weapons, then the United States may find itself vulnerable to radiological
terrorism.
This thesis argues that radiological devices are viable weapons for WMD
terrorism. Radiological weapons are only viable weapons if the nuclear material required
to produce them is accessible and if terrorists are motivated to use the weapons. This
thesis will show that the nuclear material is accessible throughout the world by theft or
diversion. It will also discuss the motivations for using radiological weapons:
psychological aspects, technical aspects, choice radionuclides for terrorism, and dispersal
scenarios. Understanding the viability of radiological weapons and how they might be
employed by terrorists allows U.S. organizations and the intelligence community to
possibly deter the initial use of the weapons and prepare appropriate responses to
minimize casualties and damage.
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION
This thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter introduces the
argument and general issues. The second chapter discusses the psychological aspects of
radiological weapons and the technical aspects of eight radionuclides that can be used for
radiological weapons. The third chapter determines the availability of nuclear material
throughout the world for radiological weapons. This is accomplished by examining the
abundance of radionuclides in various fields: medicine, commercial industry, food
industry, nuclear power, and nuclear weapons and the physical security of the nuclear
material. The fourth chapter discusses the motivations for radiological terrorism and
examines radiological dispersal scenarios. No U.S. government agency nor the intelligence
community can effectively deter, counter, or minimize casualties and damage without an
accurate depiction of the types of situations where radiological weapons might be
employed. The concluding chapter discusses the major findings of the thesis and the
implications of radiological terrorism for the U.S. intelligence community.

H. RADIOLOGICALWEAPONS -A THREAT OF THE FUTURE
The U.S. WMD focus centers around the fact that the United States is primarily
concerned with chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. Yet, radiological devices
possess both the psychological ~ nuclear phobia and risk perception ~ and technical
aspects — radioactive contamination ~ to be sufficiently complementary to terrorism.
Radiological weapons receive inadequate focus in the United States. The correct focus
needs to distinguish radiological terrorism from nuclear terrorism.
This chapter discuses the psychological and technical aspects of radiological
weapons. Nuclear phobia is supported by two case studies ~ Three Mile Island and
Chernobyl — and the public's perception of risk. The technical section of the chapter
examines eight radionuclides. The technical characteristics ~ the radionuclide's half-life,
particle emission, and the permissible limits by inhalation and oral intake — support the
fact that it requires a small amount of nuclear material to contaminate an individual. This
contamination can trigger or reinforce nuclear phobia.
A. U. S. WMD FOCUS
The United States is committed to deterring and countering the use ofWMD
against its territories, its armed forces, and its allies. Deterrence, as a matter of policy, is
primarily focused against other nation-states; nation-states are the greatest threat to the
sovereignty of the United States and its vital interests. The secondary focus of deterrence
is on sub-state actors; who can hold a society hostage through the threat of detonation or
detonation of a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon.
In an era of declining defense budgets, the present U.S. focus and resource
allocation against WMD is logical. However, the scope of the focus is too narrow. It
underestimates radiological weapons. Radiological devices have two distinct aspects:
technical and psychological. U.S. government analysis relies on the technical merits of a
radiological weapon. It must be understood that radiological weapons can not cause the
immediate wide spread death and destruction associated with nuclear, chemical, or
biological weapons. However, radiological weapons are excellent terror weapons and the
United States is clearly susceptible to the psychological terror of these weapons.
B. NEW U.S. CONCERN: RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
Radiological weapons may not be able to produce the massive deaths which can be
produced by nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, but they can instill phenomenal fear
and widespread panic within a society. Current policy and politics will never allow
radiological weapons to be classified as anything other than WMD because the weapons
contain nuclear material and they produce fear and paranoia similar to true WMD.
Even though radiological weapons are considered WMD, there is no international
treaty prohibiting the production or use of radiological weapons. 5 The opportunity and
propensity for terrorists to use radiological devices continues to exist today. Radiological
weapons are an excellent choice for terrorists to use to hold a society hostage to their
demands. The mere mention of nuclear material strikes fear into the public and plays on
the nuclear phobia which exists throughout the world.
Clearly, a definition of radiological terrorism is required. As such, it is useful to
distinguish between nuclear terrorism and radiological terrorism. There is a greater threat
from radiological terrorism than there is from a terrorist organization obtaining and
detonating a nuclear weapon.
1. Nuclear Terrorism
Since the early 1970's, nuclear terrorism has been defined as all acts of terrorism
involving weapons containing nuclear material. 6 Karl-Heinz Kamp states that nuclear
terrorism ranges
5
Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr., Special Representative of the President for Arms Control and Non-
proliferation and Head ofthe United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, lecture given at the
Naval Postgraduate School on 30 November 1995. Ambassador Graham stated that a treaty banning
radiological weapons was considered in Geneva until 1984. The primary focus was on terrorist attacks
against commercial nuclear power plants. The treaty never materialized because of the lack ofconsensus
concerning the dangers ofradiological weapons.
6 A comprehensive and historical overview of nuclear terrorism can be found in the following citations:
Louis Rene Beres, Terrorism and Global Security: The Nuclear Threat (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979);
Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander, eds., Nuclear Terrorism: Defining the Threat (Washington:
Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers Inc., 1986); Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander,
eds., Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: The Report and Papers of the International Task Force on Prevention
ofNuclear Terrorism (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1987); Frank Barnaby, Weapons of Mass Destruction:
A Growing Threat in the 1990's?. Conflict Studies 235 (London: Research Institute for the Study of
Conflict and Terrorism, October/November 1990), 3-15; Karl-Heinz Kamp, Nuclear Terrorism - Facts and
Fiction (Sankt Augustin near Bonn: Konard-Adenauer-Stiftung, Department of Political Research, 1995);
from the actual detonation of nuclear weapons or acts of nuclear violence, for
example, in the form of the release of radioactive substances or the radioactive
contamination of drinking water, to acts of sabotage in and against nuclear power
plants. The 'nuclear' aspect can either relate to the means employed by the
terrorists (nuclear weapons) or to their target (i.e., nuclear reactors). 7
This definition is too broad. In many countries throughout the world, especially in the
United States, there is a fear of anything nuclear. Kamp's broad definition of nuclear
terrorism can be used to spread fear which can result in public panic. The horrific image
of the mushroom cloud and the resulting massive destruction are associated with the term
"nuclear terrorism." Yet Kamp's definition includes much more than nuclear weapons. A
more realistic definition is required for U.S. policy.
2. Radiological Terrorism
The first step in defeating the nuclear fear and increasing public awareness is to
redefine the threat in realistic terms. The term nuclear terrorism should refer only to
terrorism conducted with a nuclear weapon, while radiological terrorism should refer to all
other incidents using nuclear material. Therefore, the definition of radiological terrorism is
terrorism designed to coerce a government to change one of its policies by inducing or
attempting to induce widespread public panic through the detonation or threat of
detonation of a radiological device. Supporting objectives might include monetary or
and Uwe Nerlich, The Political and Strategic Analysis of Nuclear Non-state Actors and Sponsoring States:
What to Look For? (Ebenhausen, Germany: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Forschungsinstitut
fur Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, August 1994), Report Prepared for Sandia National Laboratories.
7
Karl-Heinz Kamp, Nuclear Terrorism - Facts and Fiction, 3-4.
10
economic extortion, inflicting an unacceptable level of casualties, degrading foreign
military capabilities by disrupting force mobilization, command and control, and
intelligence activities, dissolving an international coalition;8 or "to compensate for
NATO's superiority in conventional forces and technology."9
Redefining the definitions is key to constructing a viable national policy to counter
the use of radiological weapons and to be able to discuss possible scenarios in realistic
terms. One must remember that it may be possible for a terrorist organization to obtain
and use a nuclear weapon, but it is highly improbable that it will occur. Nuclear weapons
in the five declared nuclear weapon states are under tight control and security. 10 A
terrorist organization will need sponsorship of a nation-state to safely obtain, transport,
and use a nuclear weapon. In this unlikely event, the sponsoring non-nuclear weapon
state will maintain control of the stolen nuclear weapon because it would be their "trump
card" in any regional conflict or superpower intervention against that nation-state.
Robert Grant, Counterproliferation and International Security: The Report ofa U.S.-French Working
Group (Arlington: U.S.-Crest, 1995), 11.
9
Gregory L. Schulte, "Responding to Proliferation - NATO's Role," NATO Review, July 1995, 18.
10 The five nuclear weapon states are the United States, Russia, China, Great Britain, and France.
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C. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
1. Nuclear Phobia
Nuclear phobia is defined as the real and perceived fear associated with the atom.
The real fear is based on the effects of ionizing radiation and the destructive power of
nuclear weapons. The perceived fear is based on the misconceptions, fear of the
unknown, and lack of public awareness concerning nuclear energy which are common in
today's society.
Nuclear phobia was solidified by the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki. The phobia has been grown and cultivated over the past forty years. "A
word association study in the 1970's illustrated that of emotional responses to the word
'atom,' the majority of people thought of 'Hiroshima,' 'death,' and 'destruction.' 11
Clearly, these perceptions continue to plague the atom " 12
The power of the atom was not only harnessed for its destructive power, but also
as an almost limitless source of energy. Beginning with the U.S. Atoms for Peace
program, the advanced nuclear states spread commercial nuclear power around the globe.
As it spread so did the accompanying nuclear phobia. Despite the widespread fear of the
atom, many scientists continue to hail nuclear power as the energy solution for the
twenty-first century. However, this view is not shared by society. The general public
" Spencer Weart, Nuclear Fear: A History of Images (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), 5.
12
David Williams, "Why Countries Want Nuclear Weapons: Postmodernism and Nuclear Proliferation,'
Unpublished Research Paper (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, July 1996), 14.
12
knows very little concerning the advantages and disadvantages of nuclear power. 13 The
public still fears the atom because of its destructive power.
Nuclear phobia is reinforced by accidents in the nuclear power industry. The two
most significant accidents are Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. Both are examined for
their real radiological concerns and their contributions to enhancing the nuclear phobia that
exists today.
a. Three Mile Island Case Study
The Three Mile Island accident occurred 28 March 1979, approximately
ten miles south of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. The accident was due to the loss of coolant
to the reactor core, which caused a partial melt down. Despite the common perception,
there was no catastrophic nuclear accident at this plant. There were small, isolated
releases of radioactive material — venting of safety valves to relieve pressure ~ into the
atmosphere for three days. The releases did not cause any health effects to the
surrounding population in Pennsylvania or neighboring states. 14 Sixty plant employees
13 A brief summary of the advantages of nuclear power industry can be found in the following documents:
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Information Digest 1995 Edition, NUREG-1350 Vol. 7 (Washington:
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Administration, Printing and Mail Services Section,
1995); NRC: Regulator of Nuclear Safety, NUREG/BR-0164, Rev. 1 (Washington: Office of Public Affairs,
June 1993); Nuclear Energy Facts: Questions and Answers (Chicago: American Nuclear Society, 1988);
Nuclear Energy Low-Level Radioactive Wastes (Chicago: American Nuclear Society Public
Communications Department, 1993); and Transporting Radioactive Materials (Chicago: American Nuclear
Society Public Communications Department, 1993).
14 A complete explanation and summary of the nuclear power accident at Three Mile Island can be found in
the following sources: Report of the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island. The
Need For Change: The Legacy of TMI (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1979); Mark Stephens,
Three Mile Island (New York: Random House, 1980); and "Nuclear Power Accident," Facts on File
World News Digest. 6 April 1979, 241, Al.
13
were contaminated during the accident, none ofwhom required hospitalization. All
releases of radioactive material or exposure were within the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission's legal limits.
Three Mile Island had a profound psychological impact upon the general
public in the United States and to a smaller extent, elsewhere. The public's nuclear
phobia and their fear of the unknown were increased by the declared state of emergency,
the media's coverage of the accident, and by the statements made by public officials
concerning the possible effects of a catastrophic failure at a nuclear power plant. The
hysteria began with the initial media coverage of the accident.
The first reports dealt with the releases of the radioactive gases ~ iodine,
krypton, and xenon ~ over a four county area. These reports were followed by the
detection of low levels of radiation in the atmosphere as far as twenty miles from Three
Mile Island. The media reported the fact that the reactor building had over one thousand
times the normal level of radiation; which is a logical consequence to the flooding of the
room enclosing the reactor. The fact that the contamination was contained in the reactor
building was down-played in the media. There was even an inaccurate report of a single
sample of iodine contaminated milk found five miles from Three Mile Island. This milk
contamination claim was dismissed due to the fact that the traces of iodine were close to
the minimum measurable level. 15
15
"Nuclear Power Accident," Al.
14
The most significant contributions to the public's nuclear phobia came
from public officials and university professors. Governor Thornburgh advised pregnant
women and preschool children within a five mile radius of Three Mile Island to leave the
area until further notice. He ordered twenty-three schools closed and advised the
surrounding population to stay indoors until the end of the state of emergency. Nuclear
phobia continued to grow as the media broadcast negative comments concerning the
accident and the release of radiation. George Wald, Nobel Prize winning biologist, stated
that "every dose of radiation is an overdose. A little radiation does a little harm and more
of it does more harm." 16 Ernest Sternglass, University of Pittsburgh radiology professor,
stated that "the reaction of the community should be to stand up and scream. The risk
for pregnant women and young children is significantly increased." 17
All of the aforementioned actions and statements were made for the safety
of the public, but they bordered on being overly cautious and contributed to the town's
over-reaction. People made "extraordinary withdrawals" from banks in the surrounding
areas;
18
approximately twelve hundred people moved to civil defense emergency shelters;
and five percent of the twenty thousand people within a mile radius of Three Mile Island
left the area. The perceived danger combined with nuclear phobia and fear ofthe
unknown drove people to overreact. It can be seen how easy it would be for a terrorist to
play upon the nuclear phobia of these people.
16
"Nuclear Power Accident," Al.
17
"Nuclear Power Accident," Al.
18
"Nuclear Power Accident," Al.
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b. Chernobyl Case Study
Chernobyl, the worst nuclear accident in history, occurred 26 April
1986.
19
It was the result of a loss of control over a test designed to stop the coolant flow
to the reactor. The loss of control culminated in an explosion in the reactor building,
which produced a massive release of radiation into the atmosphere and contaminated
ground debris. Nuclear isotopes consisted of cesium- 13 7, iodine, plutonium-239,
strontium-90, and uranium. The Soviet Union estimated that half of the released
radioactive material fell within an eighteen mile radius of Chernobyl. 20 The remaining
material was spread over parts of Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Europe. Over seventeen
and a half million people live in the most severely affected regions of Belarus, Ukraine,
and Russia.
The Chernobyl disaster reinforced nuclear phobia for millions of people
and increased the fears of long term health risks from radioactive fallout. These fears have
not diminished despite the fact that the World Health Organization determined that there
were no immediate acute health effects beyond the region surrounding the reactor and
some "hot spots" in the Soviet Union and Europe, which were created by rain bearing
19 A comprehensive summary of the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident can be found in the following sources:
Barbara Crossette, "Chernobyl Fund Depleted as Problems Rise," New York Times, 29 November 1995,
All; Piers Paul Read, Ablaze: The Story of the Heroes and Victims of Chernobyl (New York: Random
House, 1993); Grigori Medvedev, No Breathing Room: The Aftermath of Chernobyl (New York: Basics
Books, 1993); Grigori Medvedev, The Truth About Chernobyl: An Exciting Minute-Bv-Minute Account
By a Leading Soviet Nuclear Physicist of the World's Largest Nuclear Disaster and Coverup (New York:
Basic Books, 1991); V.M. Chernousenko, Chernobyl: Insight from the Inside (New York: Springer-Verlag,
1991); "Learning From Chernobyl," Foreign Affairs, 1986/1987 Winter, 304; and David R. Marples,
Chernobyl & Nuclear Power in the USSR (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1986).
20
"Learning From Chernobyl," 304.
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radioactive clouds.
21 These are genuine fears since no extensive medical research has been
done on long term health effects created by exposure to low levels of ionizing radiation. 22
The nuclear phobia produced by the Chernobyl disaster is a result of real radiological
effects to the surrounding populations.
The radiological effects are composed of both physical and psychological
factors. There are four physical aspects of the disaster. First, a total of thirty-one
people died from Chernobyl; two ofwhich were a direct result ofthe explosion. Second,
two hundred nine people were hospitalized for thermal bums and acute radiation
poisoning. Third, six hundred ninety-six thousand people were given medical exams.
Over eighty percent of these people were immediately released. Finally, one hundred
thirty-five thousand people were evacuated from a thirty kilometer radius from the
Chernobyl nuclear power plant. 23 The massive number of people evacuated increased the
fear of nuclear power. The mere mention of a radiological weapon or nuclear reactor
sabotage that could produce effects on the scale of the Chernobyl disaster strikes fear in
millions of people throughout the world.
The psychological impact is composed of three factors. First, the massive
evacuation of the thirty kilometer zone was required not only for the safety of the people
living in the region, but the size of the evacuation zone became the psychological standard
21
"Learning From Chernobyl" 304.
22
The most extensive medical research on long term radiation effects has been done on the survivors of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These effects were the direct result of exposure to high levels of radiation
produced by atomic weapons.
23
"Learning From Chernobyl," 304.
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by which people immediately judge reports of nuclear accidents. Second, the European
Economic Community banned all fresh food imported from countries within a one
thousand kilometer radius of Chernobyl. The ban was a result of the perceived risk of an
increasing cancer and thyroid maladies. 24 Third, Poland publicly announced that it was
administering potassium iodine to its children to decrease the effects of exposure from the
radioactive fallout.
Fears of increases in the risk of cancer or being contaminated by nuclear
material drove Europe and neighboring countries to the aforementioned measures. Nuclear
phobia and the concern for future generations, regardless of a real or perceived threat,
overrides any desire for profit from trade. Countries turn isolationist in the event of a
nuclear accident. This isolationism is a result of not only the nuclear phobia, but also the
public's ignorance and lack of awareness concerning the atom.
The nuclear phobia that began ten years ago at Chernobyl was rekindled on
23 April 1996. A forest fire burned for seven and half hours in an eighteen mile exclusion
zone surrounding Chernobyl. Strong winds blew contamination towards Kiev. The
exclusion zone is one of the most heavily contaminated areas of cesium- 137. 25 Radiation
24
"Learning From Chernobyl," 304.
25
"Chernobyl Fire Releases Radioactivity," Monterey County Herald, 24 April 1996, A2.
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levels inside the exclusion zone ranged from "four to ten-fold increase in the radiation
from cesium in certain areas"26 after the fire. 27
The scare over new contamination was increased when Ukraine authorities
announced on 25 April 1996 that a container of radioactive material was not completely
sealed, nor was it properly disposed of by workers at the nuclear power plant. 28 The
fears of new contamination and the carelessness by the workers at Chernobyl during the
anniversary week of the Chernobyl disaster reinforces the world's nuclear phobia and
perception of the risks involved in nuclear power.
c. Summary of Nuclear Phobia Case Studies
Although nuclear phobia was solidified with the dropping of the atomic
bomb in 1945, it is as strong as ever today. Both Three Mile Island and Chernobyl
reinforced the public's nuclear phobia. There are real concerns over a nuclear disaster. A
disaster could be caused by a catastrophic failure of a nuclear plant's safety features or as
a direct result of sabotage by terrorists. Nuclear phobia will continue to grow as long as
the general public remains ignorant ofthe facts concerning the atom.
26 «Chernobyl Forest Fire Sparks Fears of Radiation," Monterey County Herald. 25 April 1996, A2.
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The significance of this observation can not be determined. It can be assumed that the increase is above
the normal radiation level; yet one must ask how dangerous the increase is? Incomplete reporting and
attempts to quantify dangers can increase the public's fear.
28
"Radioactive Debris Found at Chernobyl," Monterey County Herald, 26 April 1996, A2.
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2. Risk Perception and Nuclear Phobia
Terrorists can use the nuclear phobia that pervades the United States and the
world to their advantage. Nuclear phobia is enhanced by the perception of significant
health risks caused by the exposure to ionizing radiation, which increases the probability
for cancer. The actual probabilities for increasing the risk of cancer are all scenario
dependent. The length of exposure, dose, type of isotope, and method of exposure —
ingestion or inhalation — are variables that must be accounted for in determining the risk
of cancer. The risk is generally very low and insignificant when compared to the number
of naturally occurring cases of cancer.
The scientific facts concerning the dangers of exposure to ionizing radiation are
lost on the general public. Risk perception, evaluation, and regulatory efforts are driven
by the "the public's fear of cancer."29 Thus, government regulation is driven by the
public's perception of any threat which can cause a major risk of increasing cancer. 30
The general public's perception of risk is radically different from experts in the
various scientific fields. Experts base their risk assessments upon scientific findings. The
public bases its risk perception upon the negative attributes of hazards. The five
attributes that have the greatest impact upon nuclear phobia are: (1) involuntary exposure
to risk, (2) lack of personal control over the outcome, (3) uncertainty about the
29
Stephen G. Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1993), 3.
30
Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle, 3.
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probabilities or consequences of exposure, (4) fear ofthe unknown, and (5) genetic effects
of exposure which could threaten future generations. 31
The lack of public awareness prevents a majority of the general public from
accepting the views of the experts. This is particularly true with nuclear power. "Risks
associated with toxic waste dumps and nuclear power appear near the bottom of most
expert lists; they appear near the top of the public's list of concerns."32 Nuclear phobia
is based on the public's perception of the risks involved in uncontrollable and
catastrophic nuclear threats to society and future generations.
There has been a growing distrust of experts, academics, and government
institutions since the mid-1960s. 33 This is primarily due to the fact that the experts can
not agree with each other, nor do they agree with government officials. The public does
not know whom to consider an expert or which expert is actually correct.
The lack of confidence and trust in experts and the government creates an
environment which allows nuclear phobia to thrive. Questions concerning a nuclear threat
deal directly with the public's safety, health issues, risk of cancer, proper response, and
environmental clean up. If there is no confidence in the information presented by the
government concerning a radiological weapon, then the government may face extreme
31
Risk: Analysis, Perception and Management. Report of a Royal Society Study Group (London: Royal
Society, 1992), 101.
32
Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle, 33.
33
Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle, 36.
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public pressure to appease the terrorists because of the horrific images ofWMD. The
lack of trust has a significant impact upon the responses to radiological terrorism.
3. Radiological Terrorism, the Media, and Risk Perception
Appeasement of terrorist demands means that the terrorist organization has
obtained its objectives. A successful terrorist act will give credibility to the terrorist
organization and give the organization power in the international political arena.
Therefore, terrorists may choose a weapon that will obtain their goals while
simultaneously giving them increased status in the international political arena. A
radiological weapon fulfills the terrorist requirements.
Radiological terrorism relies upon nuclear phobia and risk perception. The sub-
clinical effects of radiological weapons, which increase the public's fear of an increased
risk of cancer, allow terrorists to manipulate the public into pressuring a government.
The public's fear and nuclear phobia are exacerbated by the media coverage of the terrorist
act.
Terrorists rely on the media to spread their cause and reach their target audience.
The duration of the media coverage is important. The longer the terrorist group maintains
media coverage the longer it has to spread its agenda to the target society. The coverage
increases the public panic and demonstrates that the government can not protect society
from such activities. The media has the responsibility to keep the public informed. Yet,
the media inadvertently becomes a terrorist pawn as they attempt to provide adequate
coverage ofthe act.
22
The terrorist act feeds on the media coverage which exacerbates the nuclear fear,
which in turn, favors the terrorists objectives. These casual links become a vicious cycle
which feeds upon itself and subsequently undermines the security of the United States.
The cycle can be easily broken in two places. First, the media must try must not allow
themselves to inadvertently aid the terrorist's objectives. There is a fine line between
informing the public and increasing the fears of the public. The media problem may be
impossible to completely solve, but responsible media organizations are cooperative with
the U.S. government when dealing with terrorist incidents. 34 Second, an aggressive public
awareness program concerning nuclear energy, nuclear medicine, the effects of ionizing
radiation, and the risks of cancer must be instituted. The information presented to the
public must provide both the positive and negative aspects of the atom. A one sided
discussion is conducive to increasing the fear and distrust of the general public, rather than
decreasing the fear and distrust.
D. TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF RADIOLOGICALWEAPONS
Nuclear isotopes are used in a wide range of activities: nuclear weapons, nuclear
reactors, industrial applications, food processing, and medical treatment. Hundreds of
isotopes are used in the aforementioned fields. The best isotopes to actually produce a
34 A discussion of the media's role in terrorism can be found in Yonah Alexander and Richard Latter, eds.
Terrorism and the Media: Dilemmas for Government, Journalists and the Public (New York: Brassey's
Inc., 1990) and Harold J. Vetter and Gary R. Perlstein, Perspectives on Terrorism (Pacific Grove:
Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1991).
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real effect to a person's health are the isotopes with a short half life. The shorter the half
life, the greater the specific activity with the implication of a greater amount of ionizing
radiation in a short period of time. Isotopes that emit a combination ofgamma and alpha
or beta particles are the most useful for a terrorist. The gamma particles can produce
effects from outside the body, while alpha and beta particles produce the most damage
once inside the body. The greatest risks of increased cancer and adverse health effects
occur after the inhalation or ingestion of isotopes that emit alpha or beta particles.
The following radionuclides are isotopes of choice for a radiological weapon:
americium-241, strontium-90, iodine-131, cobalt-60, cesium- 13 7, uranium-235, uranium-
238, and plutonium-239. Irradiated reactor fuel assemblies (spent fuel rods) are also an
ideal choice for radiological weapons. 35 These radionuclides were chosen because of their
availability, particle emission, and half life. The technical aspects of the isotopes deal
with the maximum yearly intake of radionuclides allowed by U.S. law for occupational
workers. The following three tables summarize the technical characteristics of the eight
selected radionuclides for terrorism.
55
The selection of isotopes was based upon the number of over lapping uses in industry, nuclear power,
and the medical field; half-life of the isotopes; and the combination of gamma, alpha and beta particle
emissions. Irradiated reactor fuel assemblies were chosen because of the sheer volume of spent fuel rods
throughout the world and the lack of adequate security measures in many nations of the world that possess
nuclear reactors.
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Table 1 : Half-life, Particle Emission, and Specific Activity






472.2 Years Alpha & Gamma 3.21 E 00
Cesium-137 30.5 Years Beta & Gamma 98.50 E 00
Cobalt-60 5.3 Years Beta & Gamma 1.14E03
Iodine-131 8.0 Days Beta & Gamma 1.24 E 05
Plutonium-239 24,722.2 Years Alpha & Gamma 6.17 E -02
Strontium-90 27.7 Years Beta 1.44 E 02
Uranium-23 5 2.6 E 11 Years Alpha & Gamma 2.15 E -06
Uranium-23 8 1.6 E 12 Years Alpha & Gamma 3.34 E -07
Sources: Half-life and particle emission information was obtained from the Chart of the
Nuclides: With Physical Constants, Conversion Factors and Periodic Table, Thirteenth
Edition (San Jose: General Electric Company, Nuclear Energy Operations, 1984). The
specific activity of the radionuclides was obtained from the CRC Handbook of Materials
Science, Volume III: Nonmetallic Materials and Applications (Cleveland: CRC Press,
1975), 319-20.
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7.60 E 00 3.04 E -05 9.47 E -06
Cesium- 13 7 3.00E01 1.00 E -04 1.02 E -06
Cobalt-60 9.80E01 3.92 E -04 3.44 E -07
Iodine-131 4.00 E 00 1.60 E -05 1.30E-10
Plutonium-239 9.00 E 00 3.60 E -05 5.83 E -04
Strontium-90 8.00 E -01 3.20 E -06 2.22 E -08
Uranium-23 5 7.40 E 00 2.96 E -05 13.80 E 00
Uranium-238 1.20 E 00 4.80 E -06 14.37 E 00
Sources: The permissible quarterly intake of radionuclides was obtained from the CRC
Handbook of Chemistry and Physics, 76th Edition 1995-1996 (New York: CRC Press,
1995), Chap 16, 27-33. The permissible intakes are recommended by the NCRP and
ICRP for occupational exposure. These recommendations can be found in NBS
Handbook 69: Maximum Permissible Body Burdens and Maximum Permissible
Concentrations of Radionuclides in Air and Water for Occupational Exposure
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959); NCRP Report No. 32: Radiation
Protection in Education Institutions (Washington: NCRP Publications, 1966); and ICRP
Publication 60: 1990 Recommendations ofthe International Commission on Radiological
Protection (London: Pergamon Press, 1991).
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Americium-241 3.80 E -03 1.52 E -08 4.74 E -09
Cesium-137 4.00 E 01 1.60 E -04 1.62 E -06
Cobalt-60 2.00 E 02 8.00 E -04 7.02 E -07
Iodine- 1 3
1
5.30 E 00 2. 12 E -05 1.71 E-10
Plutonium-239 1.10 E -03 4.40 E -09 7.10 E -08
Strontium-90 7.30 E -01 2.92 E -06 2.02 E -08
Uranium-23 5 2.90 E -01 1.16 E -06 0.54 E 00
Uranium-238 4.50 E -02 1.80 E -07 0.64 E 00
Sources: The permissible quarterly intake of radionuclides was obtained from the CRC
Handbook of Chemistry and Physics, 76th Edition 1995-1996 (New York: CRC Press,
1995), Chap 16, 27-33. The permissible intakes are recommended by the NCRP and
ICRP for occupational exposure. These recommendations can be found in NBS
Handbook 69: Maximum Permissible Body Burdens and Maximum Permissible
Concentrations of Radionuclides in Air and Water for Occupational Exposure
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959); NCRP Report No. 32: Radiation
Protection in Education Institutions (Washington: NCRP Publications, 1966); and ICRP
Publication 60: 1990 Recommendations ofthe International Commission on Radiological
Protection (London: Pergamon Press, 1991).
Table one indicates that the eight selected isotopes meet the criteria of a short
half-life, multiple particle emission, and a high specific activity with the implication of a
greater amount of ionizing radiation in a short period of time. The greater the amount of
ionizing radiation, the greater the chance of increasing the risk of cancer. The Nuclear
Regulatory Commission permissible quarterly intake of radionuclides is based upon the
maximum permissible dose for occupational exposure. 35 The maximum amount of
35 The occupational maximum permissible dose is five rem per year. This dose is above the normal dose
ofthree hundred millirem per year received from normal background radiation.
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radionuclides in grams was calculated by multiplying the specific activity of the isotope
by the permissible yearly intake. Tables two and three indicate that only a very small
amount of nuclear material is required to obtain an exposure greater than the U.S.
occupational maximum permissible dose. This exposure will increase an individual's risk
of cancer and reinforce their nuclear phobia.
The doses indicated by tables two and three are not acute doses of ionizing
radiation; they are all in the sub-clinical range. This range is zero to one hundred rems,
which is well within the natural amount that everyone on earth receives each year. It is
highly improbable that a radiological weapon used by terrorists could immediately
disperse enough material, of optimal particle size, to cause an ionizing radiation exposure
in the therapeutic range of one hundred to one thousand rems. 36 Ifgoal was to
immediately produce a massive number of deaths, then a nuclear, chemical, or biological
weapon would be a better choice. However, if the terrorist's goal is to appear to have the
capability to cause a large number of deaths, then a radiological weapon is ideal. The
psychological and technical aspects of a radiological weapon make it an excellent choice
for terrorists.
36
It is possible to produce large scale contamination with a radiological weapon. However, a tremendous
amount of nuclear material would be required to produce the contamination. Significant quantities of stolen
or diverted nuclear material will draw attention and close scrutiny from government officials. Terrorist
organizations will want a radiological weapon that uses a small amount of nuclear material that can diverted
or stolen with a minimal chance of detection. The terrorist's goal is to appear to have the ability to
produce large scale contamination. Perception is everything when dealing with radiological terrorism.
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E. SUMMARY
The United States is committed to deterring WMD and the terrorist organizations
who may be determined to use it. The U.S. threat analysis on WMD terrorism should be
expanded to include radiological terrorism. Governments need to acknowledge that there
is a significant difference between nuclear terrorism and radiological terrorism. Nuclear
terrorism is more difficult than radiological terrorism. Precise definitions allow for an
accurate threat analysis and realistic resource allocation. Although radiological weapons
are not true WMD, they can cause contamination and fear.
Nuclear phobia is well established in the United States and in many societies
throughout the world. Nuclear power accidents, such as Three Mile Island and
Chernobyl, reinforce the public's fear of the atom. Nuclear phobia and the general risk of
cancer gives credibility to the psychological aspect of radiological weapons. Nuclear
phobia can be decreased by a public awareness program concerning the atom.
Sub-clinical effects from ionizing radiation will not immediately produce a
significant number of deaths, but it is enough for terrorists to tap into the public's fear of
anything nuclear. Resulting hysteria will generate a considerable amount of public
pressure upon a government. Governments must resist this pressure and not give in to
the terrorist demands. Any appeasement will give credibility to the terrorist act.
29
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EH AVAILABILITY OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL
This chapter discusses the availability of nuclear material for radiological weapons
and terrorism. The assessment begins with an examination of the types of radionuclides
that are used throughout the world; followed by a discussion of the locations of the
nuclear material. The accessibility of nuclear material is determined by the physical
security of the material. Radionuclides under minimum or questionable security measures
will be primary targets for theft and diversion to sub-state actors.
A. USES OF RADIONUCLIDES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD
The general public thinks that nuclear material has only two uses: nuclear
weapons and commercial nuclear power. Radionuclides are used in a variety of industries
ranging from defense to food preparation. The primary sources of nuclear material are the
medical field, commercial industry, food industry, nuclear power plants, naval propulsion
reactors, research reactors, and dismantled nuclear weapons fissile material. 37
37
Research reactors are used by both governments and universities around the world.
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1. Medical
Nuclear medicine began in the 1950's. Radionuclides are primarily used for
research and in irradiation treatment of various medical conditions and cancer. Treatment
can be from sealed and unsealed sources. Sealed sources are used to externally irradiate
the human body; such as in radiotherapeutic treatment. These sources are used in
radiology departments, medical clinic x-ray machines, and also to sterilize "medical
products, bandages, operating gowns, pharmaceuticals and, in particular, plastic syringes,
which would distort with heating and for which fumigants are undesirable." 38 The most
common sealed sources are "radium, cobalt-60, iridium-192, and tantalum- 1 82.
"
39
Unsealed sources are used to internally irradiate the human body. The most common
isotopes are "iodine-131, phosphorus-32, yttrium-90, and technetium-99."40
Table four summarizes the common isotopes used as tracers in the human body
for nuclear medicine investigations and to internally irradiate the human body. Table four
demonstrates the extensive use of radionuclides in medical research and nuclear medicine.
One must understand that medical organizations, ranging from small medical clinics to
major research hospitals, use radionuclides in their day-to-day medical practices.
38
The World Nuclear Handbook (New York: Facts on File Publications, 1988), 110.
39 The World Nuclear Handbook. 95.
40
The World Nuclear Handbook. 95-6.
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Table 4: Common Isotopes Used in Nuclear Medicine
Radionuclide Half Life Medical Uses
Iodine- 131 8 days Adrenal Glands, Kidney,
Thyroid, Biological Research
Selenium-75 121 days Adrenal Glands, Pancreas,
Parathyroid Glands, Tumors,
Clinical Measurements
Technetium-99 6 hours Alimentary Tract, Biliary
Tract, Bones and Joints,





Indium- 111 2.8 days Alimentary Tract, Cerebro-
spinal Fluid, Infections,
Marrow
Iodine- 123 13 hours Biliary Tract, Brain, Kidney,
Thyroid
Thallium-201 73 hours Heart, Parathyroid Glands
Gallium-67 78 hours Infections, Tumors
Xenon-133 5.3 days Lungs, Clinical Measurements
Phosphorus-32 14.3 days Pain Relief, Prevention of
Secondary Spread of Cancer,
Biological Research
Iron-52 8.3 hours Marrow
Yttnum-90 64.1 hours Biological Research and
Clinical Measurements
Sources: Adapted from The World Nuclear Handbook (New York: Facts on File
Publications, 1988), 95-105 and Management of Radioactive Wastes Produced by Users




Industrial uses of radionuclides fall into three areas: industrial and commercial
products, power generation sources, and the food industry. Industrial and commercial
uses include, but are not limited to, the following areas: insect pest control, plant science,
animal science, sterilization, thickness measurements, non-destructive testing of welds, 41
leak testing, gas movement, water movement, silt movement, and commercial products
(i.e. smoke detectors and electronic valves). 42 The most common radionuclides used for
industrial and commercial purposes are: americium-24 1 , cesium-137, cobalt-60, polonium-
210, and plutonium. 43
Radionuclides have been used as power generation sources since the early 1970's.
The isotopes are used to power satellites, Arctic and Antarctic weather stations,
lighthouses, navigation buoys, undersea navigation beacons, and communication
applications.
44
Table five lists the common radionuclides used as sources of power.
Although power generators use relatively small amounts of nuclear material, this use
illustrates the extensive applications and industries that have access to radionuclides.
41
The World Nuclear Handbook, xiii-xv.
42
Management of Radioactive Wastes Produced by Users of Radioactive Materials (Vienna: International
Atomic Energy Agency, 1985), 9.
43
Phil Williams and Paul N. Woessner, "The Real Threat of Nuclear Smuggling," Scientific American,
January 1996, 42.
44
William R. Corliss and Robert L. Mead, Power from Radioisotopes (Washington: U.S. Atomic Energy
Commission, Division of Technical Information, 1971), 8-33.
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Cesium- 137 30.0 0.22
Promethium-147 2.6 1.8




Source: William R. Corliss and Robert L. Mead, Power from Radioisotopes (Washington:
United States Atomic Energy Commission, Division of Technical Information, 1971), 39.
3. Food Industry
Another area for commercial use of sealed sources is the food industry. The most
common isotopes are cobalt-60, cesium-137, and carbon-14. 45 Radionuclides are used to
neutralize micro-organisms in food products. "Irradiation, in a single one-stage treatment,
can destroy contaminants from insects to bacteria, without change in temperature, with
no induced radioactivity, and usually with little change in the food taste, texture and
nutritional value. A product can be treated through its final lightweight packaging for
storage, thus preventing re-contamination"46 "Effective disinfestation is important for
meeting quarantine regulations in international trade."47
45
The World Nuclear Handbook. 108-9.
47
The World Nuclear Handbook. 109.
The World Nuclear Handbook. 110.
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Radionuclides are also used by the food and agriculture industries in plant science.
Cells can be mutated by very low doses of radiation. This mutation is used to breed
stronger strains of crops that are more resistant to disease, insects, climate, and can lead
to greater rates of food preservation and dehydration. 48 The industrialized countries of
the world are more prone to use radionuclides in their food industries. As countries
continue to industrialize, there is a higher probability that the abundance of radionuclides
in the world will increase.
4. Nuclear Reactor Industry
The nuclear reactor industry is divided into two areas: nuclear power and nuclear
propulsion. The nuclear power industry is composed of commercial nuclear power
plants and research reactors. The nuclear propulsion industry contains the propulsion
reactors used by commercial and naval vessels. All of these reactors can either use
uranium or plutonium as their fuel source. The nuclear reactor industry is one of the
largest users of radionuclides and one ofthe largest producers of excess nuclear material.
All of this nuclear material is stored in various forms around the world.
The nuclear reactor industry produces waste in the form of spent reactor fuel, high
level waste (HLW), transuranic waste (TUR), and low level waste (LLW). Spent reactor




The World Nuclear Handbook. 118.
49
Spent fuel is produced by commercial light water reactors, non-light water reactors, and fuels associated
with university and government research reactors. A complete discussion and summary of radioactive
wastes can be found in the U.S. Department of Energy, Integrated Data Base Report- 1994: U.S. Spent
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fuel includes fuel used by both commercial nuclear power plants and naval propulsion
reactors. The normal life span for reactor fuel is three to four years. Spent fuel is highly
radioactive and generates large amounts of heat. Thus, heavy shielding is required for
handling. Spent fuel is stored in large pools of water at individual nuclear power plants
and at commercial reprocessing plants throughout the world. 50
High level wastes are radioactive wastes generated by the "reprocessing (chemical
separation of the uranium and plutonium from other elements) of used nuclear fuel" 51 and
spent reactor fuel rods. HLW is highly radioactive, requires heavy shielding, and is
normally found in liquid form. 52 It is comprised of numerous radionuclides. The amounts
and types of radionuclides present in HLW is dependent upon the life span of the reactor
fuel rods and the time after the discharge from the nuclear reactor. The most common
radionuclides in HLW are cesium- 13 7, cesium- 13 5, barium- 13 7, strontium-90, americium-
241, americium-243, plutonium-239, plutonium-240, uranium-233, uranium-234,
palladium- 107, and technetium-99. 53 High level wastes can be found worldwide, since all
nuclear power plants produce spent fuel.
Nuclear Fuel and Radioactive Waste Inventories. Projections, and Characteristics, DOE/RW-0006, Rev.
1 1, Prepared by Oak Ridge National Laboratory, September 1995.
50
The Nuclear Waste Primer (Washington: League of Woman Voters Education Fund, 1993), 22.
51
The Nuclear Waste Primer. 21.
52
The Nuclear Waste Primer. 21-2.
53
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and the Institute for Energy and
Environmental Research, Plutonium: Deadly Gold of the Nuclear Age (Cambridge: International Physicians
Press, 1992), 114.
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Transuranic waste "comes primarily from the reprocessing of spent fuel and use
of plutonium in the fabrication of nuclear weapons."54 The U. S. Department ofEnergy
defines TUR as "waste that is contaminated with alpha-emitting transuranic (TUR) (i.e.,
atomic numbers greater than 92) radionuclides with half-lives greater than twenty years
and in concentrations in excess ofone hundred nanocuries per gram."55 Limited shielding
is required to contain the alpha particles when handling TUR
Low level waste is defined "not by what it is, but by what it is not."56 LLW
includes all radioactive waste not classified as HLW, TUR, uranium mill tailings, or spent
nuclear fuel. LLW has short lived radionuclides and low levels of radioactivity
. Although
there are low levels of radioactivity, shielding is required to handle the wastes. LLW is
produced by nuclear power plants, government laboratories, research reactors, hospitals,
and industrial plants throughout the world. 57
54
The Nuclear Waste Primer, 22.
55 A Curie is equal to 3.70 E 10 Becquerel. A Becquerel is equal to one disintegration per second. U.S.
Department ofEnergy, Integrated Data Base Report- 1994, 75.
56
U.S. Department of Energy, Integrated Data Base Report-1994, 3.
57
The Nuclear Waste Primer, 23.
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5. Nuclear Weapons
Nuclear weapons contain either or both highly enriched uranium and plutonium. 58
The most common and highly recommended radionuclides for nuclear weapons are
uranium-235 and plutonium-239. 59 The nuclear weapon casing provides the required
shielding for the uranium and plutonium in the weapon; therefore no additional shielding
is required to handle the weapon.
Dismantled nuclear weapons that need to be permanently disposed of contain
direct-use nuclear materials. Direct-use nuclear material is composed of plutonium or
highly enriched uranium that has not been exposed to radiation or separated from highly
radioactive materials. 60 Once these nuclear materials are removed from the nuclear
weapons, the material is stored in small, shielded containers. The removed nuclear
material will eventually be destroyed or converted into fuel for commercial nuclear power
reactors.
58
Highly enriched uranium (HEU) is uranium that is enriched above twenty percent in the uranium-235
isotope.
59
Fissile material is an isotope that readily undergoes fission (splits into two or more lighter elements,
thereby releasing energy) after absorbing neutrons ofany energy. Fissile materials can undergo self-
sustaining nuclear chain reactions, in which the neutrons released in fission reactions will themselves
induce additional fission reactions. Fissile isotopes include uranium-233, uranium-235, and plutonium-
239. A complete discussion of fissile material and nuclear weapon design can be found in Graham T.
Allison, Owen R. Cote, Jr.. Richard A. Falkenrath, and Steven E. Miller, Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy:
Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1996), 203-28.
60
Report to Congressional Requesters, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status ofU.S. Efforts to Improve Nuclear
Material Controls in Newly Independent States . GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 (Washington: U.S. General
Accounting Office, 8 March 1996), 2.
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Current weapon dismantlement activities, which are primarily a result of START
I and II, between the United States and the Russian Federation are providing and will
continue to provide hundreds of tons of fissile material to be disposed of permanently.
One must understand that weapons-grade fissile material is not required for radiological
devices, but it can be used in the same manner as other nuclear material to produce
radiological weapons. Increasing the amount of fissile material, such as from dismantled
nuclear weapons, increases the chances that the material can be diverted or stolen.
B. LOCATIONS OF RADIONUCLIDES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD
Radionuclides have a multitude of legitimate uses throughout the world.
Thousands of people benefit from the medical uses of nuclear material, relatively
inexpensive electrical power provided by nuclear power plants, and greater crop yield
because of fewer cases of spoilage and genetic breeding through cell mutation by
irradiation. All of the aforementioned examples of radionuclide uses are for the purpose
of benefiting mankind. The next question in assessing the threat of radiological weapons
is to determine what countries throughout the world have industries that use
radionuclides. It must be noted that the scope of this study is not to methodically list
every facility in the world that uses radionuclides, but to show the extent to which
radionuclides have reached the far corners of the world.
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1. Non-Nuclear Power Industries
The non-nuclear power industries are the medical industry, food industry, and the
industrial commercial industries. Every country in the world has at least one hospital or
medical clinic with a radiology department. Obviously there are countries, such as the
United States, Germany, and Japan, that have hundreds of medical facilities that use
radionuclides. The major industrialized countries, such as the G-7 countries, have
extensive commercial facilities with industrial applications for radionuclides. 61 These
industries range from the flat glass industry to mining to food processing plants. Almost
every country in the world has radionuclide industries with varying amounts of nuclear
material.
2. Nuclear Reactor Industries
The commercial nuclear power industry spread throughout the world primarily
through the U. S. Atoms for Peace Program in the 1950's. Today there are hundreds of
reactors used for research, commercial power, and propulsion of naval vessels. The
nuclear support facilities, such as reprocessing plants and enrichment facilities, have
developed alongside the nuclear power programs ofthe world. Table six summarizes the
extent of the nuclear reactor industry in the world today. A detailed summary can be
found in Appendix A.
61 An example of the magnitude of radionuclide use in industry can be seen on the Kola Peninsula. The
Kola Peninsula has more than 9,352 radioactive sources distributed among 39 civilian companies and
institutions. Source is Thomas Nilsen and Nils Bohmer, Sources to Radioactive Contamination in
Murmansk and Arkhangersk Counties, Bellona Report Volume 1 (Norway: Bellona Foundation, 1994),
132.
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Table 6: Total Nuclear Reactor Industries of the World
Country Operating Power Reactors Operating Research
Reactors
North & South America 136 102
Western Europe 150 75
Eastern Europe 60 59
Africa & Middle East 2 11
Asia & Pacific 63 55
World Total 411 302
Presently, the five declared nuclear weapon states are the only countries that use
nuclear reactors for propulsion of naval vessels. These vessels range from submarines to
ice breakers. These propulsion reactors contribute high level waste, in the form of spent
fuel rods, to the nuclear waste management systems of the five nuclear weapon states.
Nuclear wastes associated with nuclear propulsion and weapons programs have
accumulated alongside the respective nuclear power programs. There is a significant
amount of nuclear high level waste in the world today and these inventories will continue
to grow in the future. Table seven shows the significant amount of high level nuclear
waste that is projected for the year 2000.
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Table 7: Projected High Level Waste Inventories for
Selected Countries by the Year 2000
Country Amount
Canada 27,000 metric tons spent fuel
Sweden 5,600 metric tons spent fuel
France 2,000 cubic meters HLW
Germany 3,300 cubic meters HLW
Switzerland 200 cubic meters HLW
United Kingdom 1,280 cubic meters HLW
United States 340,600 cubic meters HLW
Sources: Adapted from U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to the Honorable Richard
H. Bryan, U.S. Senate, Nuclear Waste: Foreign Countries' Approaches to High-Level
Waste Storage and Disposal (GAO/RCED-94-172, 04 August 1994) and U.S.
Department of Energy, Integrated Data Base Report- 1994: U.S. Spent Nuclear Fuel and
Radioactive Waste Inventories, Projections, and Characteristics, DOE/RW-0006, Rev. 1 1,
Prepared by Oak Ridge National Laboratory, September 1995.
3. Nuclear Weapons
There are five declared nuclear weapon states and three "de facto" nuclear weapon
states.
62 The total number of nuclear weapons in the world is in the tens of thousands.
The nuclear weapon programs have significant infrastructures supporting the various
programs and in some instances, the programs are directly tied to the civilian nuclear
power programs. The proliferation of nuclear weapons has increased the locations of
nuclear material throughout the world, which has increased the opportunities from which
sub-state actors can obtain radionuclides.
The three "de facto" nuclear weapon states are Israel, India, and Pakistan.
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4. Nuclear Material Smuggling
Many critics of radiological weapons maintain that the nuclear material required
for radiological weapons can not be obtained by terrorists. However, they are wrong. "In
a world in which drug smugglers routinely move cocaine around the world in amounts of
hundreds of kilograms and marijuana in ton quantities and in which European border
controls are being dismantled, the task of illicitly moving small amounts of nuclear
materials is not very daunting."64 Currently, the illicit transfer of non-weapons grade
nuclear material is being conducted in Europe and the Former Republics ofthe Soviet
Union. 65
There were fifty-nine cases of smuggled nuclear material on the European
continent between 1992-1995. The most notable incident was the 1992 confiscation of
one and half kilograms ofweapons grade highly enriched uranium. 66 As ofMarch 1996,
64
David Kay, "The IAEA," eds. Mitchell Reiss and Robert S. Litwak, Nuclear Proliferation After the Cold
War, (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994), 311.
65 A comprehensive summary of open source literature concerning the illicit transfer ofnuclear materials can
be found in the following sources: The non-proliferation data bases located at the Center for Non-
proliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA; Gordon C. Oehler,
Director, DCI's Nonproliferation Center, "The Continuing Threat from Weapons ofMass Destruction,"
Statement for the Record to the Senate Armed Services Committee, 27 March 1996; Monthly Status
Report: Illicit Trafficking ofNuclear Materials (Washington: U.S. Department ofEnergy, Office of
Emergency Management, Operations Division, January 1996); Monthly Status Report: Illicit Trafficking of
Nuclear Materials (Washington: U.S. Department ofEnergy, Office ofEmergency Management, Operations
Division, December 1995); Energy Incident Quarterly, Fall 1995, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Washington: U.S.
Department ofEnergy, Office ofEmergency Management, Office ofNonproliferation and National Security,
Operations Division, 1995); Energy Incident Quarterly, Spring 1995, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Washington: U.S.
Department of Energy, Office ofNonproliferation and National Security, Threat Assessment Division,
1995); and Black Market Trafficking in Nuclear Material, 1993 & 1994 Transactions (Washington: U.S.
Department of Energy. Office ofNonproliferation and National Security, Threat Assessment Division,
March 1995).
66
William C. Potter, "Before the Deluge? Assessing the Threat of Nuclear Leakage From the Post-Soviet
States," Arms Control Today. October 1995, 9.
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there have been eight incidents of illicit transfers of nuclear material. 66 None of the 1995
or 1996 incidents involved weapons grade nuclear material. One must remember that
radiological weapons can be produced from non-weapons grade nuclear material. This
brief chronology of nuclear material smuggling indicates that it is possible for nuclear
material to be diverted or stolen from various facilities around the world and it confirms
that nuclear material is accessible to terrorist organizations.
C. PHYSICAL SECURITY OFNUCLEAR MATERIAL
There are varying degrees of physical security for nuclear materials throughout the
world. There are international standards, national level requirements per country, and
sub-national requirements within many of the respective countries. The degree of
regulation and control of the physical security requirements for nuclear material varies by
country; ranging from absolute control and security to no security at all.
Although not perfect by any means, the United States is at the high end of the
spectrum with the most stringent control and security requirements for nuclear material.
Various foreign countries with only research reactors or medical applications for
radionuclides are at the far end of the spectrum. It is not the intent of this study to
catalog each country's physical security requirements for nuclear material. The intent is
to demonstrate that if the high end countries, such as the United States and the successor
states of the Former Soviet Union, are susceptible to theft and diversion of various types
66
Oehler, "The Continuing Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction," 27 March 1996.
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of nuclear material, then no country in the world is immune from the possibility of
terrorists circumventing physical security requirements and obtaining radionuclides
1. International Physical Security Requirements
International requirements are regulated and inspected by the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA). 67 The IAEA's security concerns are over material control,
accounting, containment, surveillance, and verification procedures. The purpose ofIAEA
safeguards is to prevent diversion of nuclear material from civilian nuclear power
programs and to provide diversion warnings to the international community. The IAEA
does not provide for the physical security requirements of the nuclear facilities.
Presently, there is "no international organization responsible for establishing or enforcing
physical protection standards."68 These types of physical security are the responsibility
of the individual governments of countries possessing nuclear materials.
The IAEA has developed physical security guidelines for member states. 69 These
guidelines are mandatory for those countries that are signatories to the 1982 Convention
on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. However, the IAEA does not enforce,
67 A comprehensive discussion of the International Atomic Energy Agency can be found in U.S. Congress,
Office of Technology Assessment, Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency, OTA-
ISS-615 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1995). Additional information concerning
international standards and safety of radiation sources can be found in International Basic Safety Standards
for Protection Against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety ofRadiation Sources (Vienna: International
Atomic Energy Agency, 1994).
68
Report to Congressional Requesters, Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. International Nuclear Materials
Tracking Capabilities Are Limited. GAO/RCED/ATMD-95-5 (Washington: U.S. General Accounting
Office, 27 December 1994), 11.
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These guidelines can be found in the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (Vienna:
International Atomic Energy Agency, 1982).
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nor inspect these minimum security guidelines. The guidelines are used primarily by the
IAEA and the United States in assessing foreign countries' physical security systems. 70
2. National and Sub-National Level Physical Security Requirements
National and sub-national level requirements for physical security of nuclear
material varies widely throughout the world. These requirements cover the nuclear
facilities, the types of nuclear material used throughout the various industries, nuclear
waste storage sites, transportation requirements, and nuclear weapons. 71 The United
States and the republics of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) are by no means perfect in
protecting their nuclear material from theft or diversion.
a. United States
At the national level, physical security requirements is the responsibility
of the Department ofEnergy (DOE) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
Security requirements for nuclear weapons are controlled by the Department of Defense.
The NRC has the authority to delegate responsibility of regulating radionuclides to the
state level. Each level of delegation adds one more varying degree of control and
70
U.S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Tracking Capabilities Limited 11.
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Transportation concerns deal with the transport of nuclear material between facilities domestically and
internationally. Theft of the nuclear material could occur during transport by truck, rail, air, and sea. A
summary of the issues involved can be found in Report to the Chairman, Committee on Governmental
Affairs, U.S. Senate, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Japan's Shipment of Plutonium Raises Concerns About
Reprocessing. GAO/RCED-93-154 (Washington: U.S. General Accounting Office, 14 June 1993) and
Shipments of Nuclear Fuel and Waste ... Are They Really Safe?. DOE/EV-004 (Washington: U.S.
Department ofEnergy, Division ofEnvironmental Control Technology, Transportation Branch, October
1977).
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enforcement of security requirements. Material accounting and control is heavily
emphasized to deal with the immense radionuclide applications in the United States.
However, DOE and the NRC are too small to meticulously track and monitor every
industry and institution using radionuclides.
The top U. S. physical security systems range from three tier perimeter
fence systems surrounding nuclear facilities to closed circuit television cameras coupled
with intrusion detection systems to monitor access to nuclear material. The low end of
the systems rests with the material accounting programs to track the use and disposal of
radionuclides. Concerns over lax security systems must be directed toward civilian
industry, nuclear waste storage sites, medical facilities, and university research reactors.
The security violations include, but are not limited to, the following examples: health
violations, environmental violations, improper disposal of radionuclides and radioactive
waste, and improper storage. 72
Despite the seemingly high level of physical security systems for U.S.
nuclear material, there have been thefts ofthe nuclear material from the various U.S.
inventories. "The General Accounting Office of the United States reports that from
1955-1977, '...unaccounted for special nuclear materials totaled in the thousands of
kilograms'."73 Furthermore, "in 1979 a GE employee was arrested for the theft of 150
72 A brief overview of the physical security concerns can be found in the following sources: Jon Marcus,
"Documents Show Colleges Routinely Mishandled Radioactive Materials," Associated Press, 15 April
1995, Domestic News; Tim Cornell, "Schools Careless With Radiation," Boston Herald. 15 April 1995,
4; and "NRC: Schools Lax on Nuke Waste," Associated Press Online, 15 April 1995.
73 CDR J.K. Campbell, "Loose Nukes, Networks, and Minds, " Unpublished Research Paper (Monterey:
Naval Postgraduate School, March 1996), 2.
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pounds of uranium. In that same year, two other individuals were arrested by federal
agents in connection with the seizure of 5000 pounds of stolen uranium."74 The wide
range of radionuclide use coupled with the possibility of lax security procedures in
various U.S. industries sets the stage for possible theft or diversion of radionuclides for
terrorist use.
b. Former Soviet Union
"Russia's nuclear material inventory - distributed over more than 50 sites -
is estimated to consist of 1,100 to 1,300 tons of [highly enriched uranium] HEU and 165
tons of separated, weapon-usable plutonium. "75 The breakup of the Soviet Union
resulted in the collapse of the centrally controlled physical security systems designed to
protect its nuclear material. Today, the new republics of the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) must rebuild a majority of those security systems.
The USSR relied upon closed cities with strong internal security measures
to protect their nuclear material.
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These closed cities had secure perimeters, large
numbers of troops protecting the facilities, and were under heavy scrutiny of the KGB.
The opening of the closed cities resulted a variety of inadequate physical security
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Campbell, "Loose Nukes," 3
.
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Potter, "Before the Deluge?," 12.
76
The nuclear material includes spent reactor fuel from nuclear weapon production plants, spent fuel from
naval propulsion reactors, fresh fuel for propulsion reactors, and high level radioactive wastes.
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measures: no perimeter fences, inadequate tamper proof seals, no intrusion detection
devices, lack of closed circuit television cameras, no base line inventory of nuclear
materials, no vehicle barriers, lack of adequate communications between guardposts,
inadequate storage facilities for dismantled nuclear weapons, poor material control and
accounting procedures, and a shortage of adequate nuclear waste disposal facilities. 77
These security problems are compounded by a lack of financial resources
in the CIS; resources which could be used to improve the physical security measures. 78
Nicolai Steinberg, Chairman of the Ukrainian State Committee for Nuclear and Radiation
Safety, stated that the "system of physical protection of nuclear material [which was in
place] does not meet the standards that currently exist elsewhere in the world." 75
77 A comprehensive summary of niinimum security measures in the Former Soviet Union can be found in
the following sources: Report to Congressional Requesters, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status ofU.S. Efforts
to Improve Nuclear Material Controls in Newly Independent States, GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89
(Washington: U.S. General Accounting Office, 8 March 1996); Report to the Honorable Bob Graham, U.S.
Senate, Nuclear Safety: Concerns With Nuclear Facilities and Other Sources ofRadiation in the Former
Soviet Union. GAO/RCED-96-4 (Washington: U.S. General Accounting Office, 7 November 1995); Frank
von Hippel, "Fissile Material Security in the Post-Cold-War World," Physics Today, June 1995, 26-31;
Pearl Marshall, "Russian Weapons Plutonium Storage Termed Unsafe by MTNATOM Official,"
Nucleonics Week. Vol. 35, No. 17, 28 April 1994, 1; Oleg Bukharin and William Potter, "Potatoes Were
Guarded Better: Stealing Nuclear Fuel From the Storage Building at Sevmorput Was - and May Still Be -
Easy," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 51, No. 3, May 1995, 46-50; Oleg Bukharin, The Threat of
Nuclear Terrorism and the Physical Security ofNuclear Installations and Materials in the Former Soviet
Union, Occasional Paper No. 2 (Monterey: Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Russian
and Eurasian Studies, August 1992); William C. Potter, "Viewpoint: Nuclear Insecurity in the Post-
Soviet States (Congressional Testimony)," The Nonproliferation Review, Spring-Summer 1994, 61-65;
and Charles Hecker, "Fears Over Russia's Decaying Nuclear Subs," San Francisco Chronicle, 14 February
1996, A8. Photographs depicting inadequate storage of spent reactor fuel can be found in Thomas Nilsen,
Igor Kudrik, and Alexandr Nikitin, Zapadnaya Litsa, Bellona Working Paper No. 5: 1995 (Norway:
Bellona Foundation, 29 November 1995).
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The lack of adequate physical security measures has directly contributed
to the actual incidents of nuclear smuggling from the FSU, which may also contribute to
the illicit transfer of radionuclides to various terrorist organizations. Mikhail Barsukov,
Director of the Federal Security Service, has stated that it is "quite possible for terrorists
to seize weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear weapons, other radioactive
materials and hazardous chemicals."80 Therefore, the FSU may be a target for terrorists
and therefore can be considered as the number one source for radionuclides in the world.
D. SUMMARY
Radiological weapons use nuclear material that is abundant throughout the world.
Numerous industries, such as medical, agriculture, industrial, commercial, and defense, use
a wide range of radionuclides in their day to day operations. These radionuclides are
under a spectrum of physical security systems. The spectrum ranges from extremely
tight physical controls to questionable security measures. Thus, radionuclides are
accessible to indigenous and determined terrorist organizations. Nation-states, such as the
United States and the Russian Federation, are not immune from theft and diversion. The
CIS can be considered as the number one source for the illicit transfer of nuclear materials.
80




IV. MOTIVATIONS AND SCENARIOS
The current terrorism debate is whether or not terrorists will use WMD.
However, WMD terrorism can not be simply categorized as demand or no demand
because radiological weapons can be attractive to both sides ofthe debate. Radiological
devices allow terrorists to operate on the threshold of causing enough casualties to obtain
their agenda, yet not lose either internal or external support for their organization.
Coordinated and effective responses can only be developed after determining how
terrorist organizations would employ radiological weapons. The nuclear material
discussed in chapter two can be effective radionuclides for radiological terrorism. The
first widely publicized act of radiological terrorism and seven radiological dispersal
scenarios are examined in this chapter.
A. ATTRACTIVENESS OF RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
The primary objective of a terrorist group is to coerce a government to meet then-
political, military, or economic agenda. Terrorists use violence or the threat ofviolence as
their mechanism to obtain a change in governmental policy. The optimal terrorist act uses
minimum force to produce maximum fear. Radiological weapons or any other WMD give
non-state actors the capacity to carry out a widespread terror campaign. The question
remains "will terrorists use WMD?" There are two views ofWMD terrorism: no demand
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for WMD and demand for WMD. 81 The demand for radiological weapons incorporates
both views ofWMD terrorism.
1. No Demand forWMD
The view that terrorists will not use WMD is based upon Brain Jenkins'
statement that "terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead."82 The
use ofWMD will produce excessive collateral damage and cause a severe reaction in both
the target audience and the government. The reactions could lead to a loss of internal and
external support for the group and could every well lead to the destruction of the terrorist
organization. If the organization survived the government retaliation, the political
legitimacy of the group would be significantly decreased. Political legitimacy is essential
if the organization is to bring about a change in government policy.
The unpredictability ofWMD also deters terrorists. Terrorists may be willing to
lose a few group members in delivering the weapons; yet a majority, if not all ofthe group
could be lost during the production of the weapon. Furthermore, the moral dilemma of
causing wide spread destruction and possibly effecting future generations may be to
horrific. Once again, the group must account for the reactions to the act if they are to
achieve their objectives.
81
The perspective of examining WMD terrorism in economic terms — demand and no demand — was
developed by Professor Gordon McCormick, Academic Advisor for SOLIC, Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, CA.
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Brian M. Jenkins, "Terrorism Found Rising, Now Almost Accepted; Nuclear Incident Unlikely, RAND
Concludes," Washington Post 3 December 1985, A4.
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2. Demand forWMD
The view that terrorists will use WMD is based upon Karl-Heinz Kamp's
statement that "the more victims of a terrorist's action, the more likely it is that it will
capture the world's headlines."83 The argument is also supported by two assumptions:
(1) the current trend that individual terrorist acts are becoming increasingly more violent
will continue and (2) current terrorist tactics and weapons will become routine.
Therefore, increasingly violent acts and routinization of weapons will lead to WMD.
Weapons of mass destruction will be used by high risk taking groups that want
collateral damage. It is the excessive destruction that will produce the dramatic reaction of
the government and reinforce the terrorist's claims to the target audience. The possibility
of the organization's destruction is out weighed by the possibility of achieving a
significant number, if not all of their objectives with one terrorist act. The act also
increases the legitimacy of the terrorists by showing that the organization is a force that
can not be ignored.
3. Demand for Radiological Weapons
The appearance or ability to kill or incapacitate a large group of people makes the
terrorist's threats and acts of violence more credible. Credible threats allow terrorist
organizations to instill widespread fear and panic in the target society. The threat or
actual use of a weapon of mass destruction accomplishes that goal. Radiological weapons
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Karl-Heinz Kamp. "An Overrated Nightmare." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 52, No. 4,
July/August 1996, 32.
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have the potential to induce more fear and long lasting public panic than conventional
weapons.
Terrorists can produce tailor made radiological weapons for a variety of scenarios.
The size of area affected, degree of health and environmental hazards produced, and
psychological impact can all be controlled by a terrorist organization. Large radiological
weapons can contaminate and disrupt large population centers, which makes the weapons
attractive from the demand view ofWMD. However, small radiological weapons that
rely more on the psychological aspects also meets the no demand view ofWMD.
Terrorists understand that there is a fine line between using violence to gain
support for their cause while simultaneously obtaining their objectives and losing
supporters through the mass destruction of the target society. Conventional weapons
allow the terrorists to stay a considerable distance from this threshold. The closer a
terrorist organization is to the threshold, the higher the payoff in holding a society
hostage and obtaining the organization's political and military objectives.
The use of a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon forces the terrorists to cross
the threshold and undermine their cause. Supporters, group cohesion, financial resources,
and political opportunity are lost. Therefore, the cost of using true WMD is too great. 84
84 Some terrorist organizations, such as those with apocalyptic views, will not be deterred from using true
WMD. The use of true WMD will draw significant media coverage. Non-apocalypUc groups that are
fighting for that same media coverage may turn to radiological weapons. Radiological terrorism gives the
perception ofWMD without crossing the threshold.
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Radiological weapons allow terrorists to operate on or near the threshold line.
The maximum benefit of nuclear phobia and the potential for significant disruption of
society is obtained. Therefore, radiological weapons meet more of the terrorists needs for
instilling fear than do conventional weapons and prevents immediate catastrophic damage
associated with true WMD. As a result, radiological weapons may become one ofthe
preferred weapons of mass destruction for terrorists.
Terrorist motives for using radiological weapons are similar to those for
conventional weapons. Non-state actors could use radiological weapons to blackmail
governments for any number of political, social, or military objectives. A terrorist group
could hide a radiological weapon in a city and attempt to extort the release of their
imprisoned brethren, destabilize a government, demand a large sum ofmoney, or force the
withdrawal of military troops from a politically sensitive area, such as Northern Ireland
or the occupied territories of Israel.
B. CHOICE ISOTOPES FOR TERRORISTS
An accurate threat analysis must determine the most likely radionuclides terrorists
would desire to obtain to manufacture radiological weapons. An optimal radionuclide for
radiological terrorism must meet the following criteria. First, a radionuclide will only be
useful if it can maintain its radioactivity through the three stages of the terrorist action:
(1) the theft of the nuclear material, (2) storage until needed, (3) and well after the
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deployment of the radiological weapon. 85 The minimum half-life of thirty days will allow
ample time for theft, storage, and deployment. Second, a terrorist will want to use an
isotope that is used in multiple industries. This will increase the difficulty of authorities
tracing the origin of the material. Third, radionuclides must be easily accessible.
Radionuclides used in civilian industries have a higher probability of being stolen due to
the increased chance of minimum physical security measures.
The choice radionuclides for radiological terrorism are based on the aforementioned
criteria, the particle emission and half-life of radionuclides discussed in chapter two, and
the availability of nuclear material discussed in chapter three. Eight choice radionuclides
are: americium-241, strontium-90, iodine-131, cobalt-60, cesium- 13 7, plutonium-239,
uranium-235, uranium-238, and spent reactor fuel rods. These isotopes have the widest
applications in both the civilian and defense industries of the world. This nuclear material
is accessible as demonstrated by the first widely publicized act of radiological terrorism
which used cesium- 13 7.
C. RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSAL SCENARIOS
This thesis thus far has shown that the psychological aspects of radiological
weapons are optimal for terrorism. The radionuclides needed for radiological weapons are
used in a multitude of industries and they are under various physical security conditions.
5 A long half-life for a radionuclide (after the terrorist act has occurred) will increase the probability of a
government response to terrorist demands due to the environmental clean-up and public demands
concerning health hazards.
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The next step in assessing the threat of radiological terrorism is to understand the types
of radiological dispersal scenarios that terrorists would use to carry out their agendas.
The scenarios must allow the terrorist organization to do the following: (1) contaminate a
group of people with either a dose equal to or greater than the annual permissible dose
allowed by law or a dose sufficient enough to induce nuclear phobia among the general
public, (2) sensational enough to obtain media coverage, and (3) depict the ability for the
terrorist to strike anywhere and anytime. The first two criteria are critical for radiological
terrorism to be successful. The third criteria is satisfied by simply carrying out the
terrorist attack. The number and types of dispersal scenarios are only limited by one's
imagination. The scenarios can be applied to the continental United States, its military
forces, and its allies.
The first widely publicized act of radiological terrorism and seven dispersal
scenarios are examined in this chapter. These scenarios allow the terrorists to attempt to
affect a large number ofpeople, gain wide spread media coverage, and tap into the nuclear
phobia that pervades the world. The scenarios are grouped into five categories: (1)
nuclear reactor sabotage, (2) dispersal by conventional explosives, (3) air dispersal, (4)
water dispersal, and (5) combined radiological and chemical weapons. The unique
combination of weapons of mass destruction terrorism can yield devastating effects and
complicate the government's response to the terrorist threat.
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1. First Widely Publicized Act of Radiological Terrorism
Until recently, the idea of terrorists using radiological weapons seemed
improbable. The first widely publicized act of radiological terrorism recently occurred in
Russia. On 23 November 1995, Chechen separatists buried thirty pounds of radioactive
cesium- 137 in Moscow's Izmailovsky Park. Shamil Basayev, a Chechen guerrilla leader,
wanted to demonstrate to the leaders ofRussia that he "could do great damage to Russia if
the war over Chechen secession did not end."86 Basayev repeatedly threatened the Russia
government with the use of nuclear and chemical weapons in his terrorist attacks to win
Chechnya's independence. 87
The media played a significant role in disseminating the Chechen separatists
threats and conveying to the Russian people the idea that the Russian government can not
protect the public from the threat of radiological weapons. Basayev used NTV — an
independent Russian television station ~ to instill widespread fear and public panic
throughout Russian society. During an NTV television interview, Shamil Basayev
"claimed that his followers had packed two similar parcels in explosives and hid them in
Moscow, where they could be set off to create 'mini-Chernobyls'."88 Basayev
specifically targeted Russian society and attempted to manipulate Russia's nuclear
phobia by instilling fear of another Chernobyl.
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The Russian government thwarted Basayev's media campaign. Various Russian
officials made televised, public statements to downplay the first act of radiological
terrorism in Russia. Aleksandr Mikhailov, of the Federal Security Service, stated that
"the first tests showed that beyond one meter from the package there was no serious
threat to health. Initial tests show that the package does not pose a serious threat to the
environment or health."90 General Andrei Terekhov, a department chief in the Interior
Ministry, stated that "none of the radioactive substances stolen could have been used to
make nuclear weapons."91 General Terekhov's statement refers to the cesium-137 found
in Izmailovsky Park, Moscow, as well as all of the nuclear material that has been reported
stolen or unaccounted for in the Former Soviet Union.
The Russian government's statements that were issued to quell public fear were
more credible than Shamil Basayev's threats and acts of terrorism. Thus, Basayev's
terrorist act did not produce the intended result. This may be due to the fact that Russia
is still not a completely open society or the Russian people are still conditioned not to
question the central authority or they are immune to ecological problems after years of
poor nuclear waste management practices. Regardless ofthe lack of success ofthe
incident, it was a specific attempt to use a radiological weapon to induce widespread
terror within Russia.
Specter, "Russians Assert Radioactive Box Posed No Danger," A5.
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It is unclear as to where the Chechen separatists obtained the cesium- 137, which
has both industrial and medical applications. Russian investigators have determined that
the cesium could have originated from three sources. The first possible source is a Ural
mining enterprise. The day after the Izmailovsky Park incident, the Ural mining
enterprise reported that "four small lead containers" had been stolen. 91 The second
possible source is "an isotope storage facility in Grozny operated by the Russian firm
'Radon'."92 The final source is any hospital in the region with a radiology facility. The
uncertainty of the origin ofthe cesium- 137 suggests that nuclear material required to
produce a radiological weapon can be obtained from a variety of relatively unsecure
sources. Although this nuclear material may not have posed a serious threat to Russian
society, it does demonstrate the ability of a non-state actor to attempt to hold a
population hostage by fear and public panic. The threat of radiological terrorism is real.
2. Nuclear Reactor Sabotage
Nuclear reactor sabotage has traditionally been defined as nuclear terrorism. This
classification is incorrect. Nuclear reactor sabotage is radiological terrorism and is a real
threat in today's world. Everyone fears another Chernobyl disaster. This fear is genuine
due to the real health effects that can be produced by a nuclear accident on the scale of the
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Chernobyl disaster. The notion of sabotage at a nuclear power plant has been reviewed
since the beginning of the concerns of nuclear proliferation and terrorists.
Many nuclear power plants have redundant safety features to prevent nuclear
accidents and core melt downs. Similar to the varying degree of physical protection
standards throughout the world, redundant safety features vary from country to country.
Although it is possible for determined terrorists to gain access to a nuclear power plant
and commit the precise sabotage required to cause a core melt down, the probability of
this type of sabotage is low. Terrorists will need a great deal of inside help from the
power plant's employees. It is unlikely to find a great number of disgruntled workers in
the key positions that will be required to cause a disaster similar to Chernobyl.
It is possible for terrorists with conventional explosives to destroy a nuclear
reactor or high level waste tank that is under minimum physical security measures. 93
These explosives could be delivered by a plane or an automobile. The destruction of a
reactor or a high level waste storage container will spread radioactive material over the
surrounding area. The effects of the dispersal of radioactive material will depend upon
the amount of conventional explosives used in the explosion, the location ofthe site to a
population center or water supply, the size of the radioactive particles upon dispersal,
the degree of radioactivity of the stored nuclear material, and the weather conditions.
93
High level nuclear waste is stored in both liquid and solid form at civilian nuclear power plants
throughout the world. The waste is stored at the reactor sites because of the indecision on how to
permanently dispose of high level nuclear waste. Until a solution is found and disposal facilities are
operational, high level nuclear waste will continue to be stored at nuclear power plants throughout the
world.
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Susceptibility to nuclear reactor sabotage is a global problem. The United States
is generally recognized as possessing the leading standard for physical security measures
for nuclear power plants in the world, but no country is perfect. On 7 February 1993, an
automobile was driven into Three Mile Island's Nuclear Generating Station, Unit One.
The vehicle crashed through a gate and parked inside a protected area next to the door of
the turbine building for approximately four hours. Fortunately, it was not a car bomb.
The U.S. nuclear industry conducted an extensive review of the physical security
measures to prevent sabotage of nuclear power plants. 94 Physical security measures of
the nuclear power plants and their respective nuclear waste storage sites are the first line
of defense against terrorists and sabotage.
94 A comprehensive summary of the issues involved in the susceptibility of United States nuclear power
plants to sabotage can be found in the following sources: Wilson Dizard III, "World Trade Center
Bombing Prompts New Look at Design Basis Threat," Inside N.R.C., Vol. 15, No. 5, 8 March 1993, 1;
Juliana Gruenwald, "NRC Studies Terrorist Threat Against Nuclear Power Plants," U.P.I., 19 March
1993; "Excerpt of the Hearing of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, Clear Air and
Nuclear Regulation Subcommittee: Rules and Regulations to Protect Commercial Nuclear Power Plants
against Terrorism and Sabotage," Federal News Service, 19 March 1993; Matthew L. Wald, "U.S.
examining Ways to Protect Nuclear Plants Against Terrorists," New York Times, 23 April 1993, A24;
Matthew L. Wald, "A-Plants Warned to be Wary of Truck Bombs," New York Times. 1 July 1993, A15;
Jeff Leeds, "U.S. Panel's Move to Upgrade A-Plant Security Draws Fire," Los Angeles Times , 26 July
1994, A5; "U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Proposes Amendments to Physical Security
Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants," U.S. Newswire. 4 November 1994; "Threat of Terrorism
Debated," Engineering News-Record. Vol. 232, No. 9, 28 February 1994, 15; Matthew L. Wald, "How
does the World look Through the Eyes of Aspiring Terrorists?," New York Times, 6 March 1994, A3;
Max Baucus, " Protect Nuclear Plants from Sabotage," Congressional Press Releases, 16 March 1994;
"NRC Revises Protections for Sabotage by Car Bomb," Nuclear News, August 1994, 26; Kathleen Hart,
"NCI Wants More Information About Scope of Final Truck-Bomb Rule," Inside NRC. Vol. 16, No. 16,
8 August 1994, 16; and Bernard Stapleton, "Maximize the Margin for Sabotage Safety; Radiological
Sabotage in Nuclear Reactors." Security Management. Vol. 38, No. 9, September 1994, 62.
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3. Conventional Explosives
Radiological weapons can be dispersed by conventional explosives. These
conventional means can range from complex bombs to the ingredients used in the
Oklahoma City Federal Building bombing. The radionuclides will be dispersed by the
detonation of explosions and will not immediately kill large numbers of people. It will
contaminate people in the immediate area to an amount of radiation greater than the
occupational limit allowed by law, which will increase the risk of cancer. The largest
numbers of immediate casualties from the radiological weapon will be those people
directly affected by the blast of the explosion.
The responding emergency teams — police, fire, and medical personnel — will help
contribute to the dispersal of the material. The material will be picked up on the response
teams' clothing and shoes as they work around the bombed area. The nuclear material
will be tracked not only throughout the site, but also through the city and the area
hospitals. This can be an extremely effective dispersal method if terrorists do not
disclose to the media the presence of a radiological weapon until after the weapon is
detonated and the response teams and clean up crews have arrived on scene. Numerous
people and a significantly large area will be contaminated. This will complicate both the
clean up effort and the government response to the terrorist action, incite public panic
based upon society's nuclear phobia, and overwhelm medical centers as they scrambled to
examine the influx of people claiming to be contaminated. A city could possibly shut
down.
65
The situation can be further complicated if the terrorists claimed that it was a
nuclear weapon that was detonated. The government experts will have to determine if the
weapon was a fizzled nuclear weapon, a radiological weapon, or a hoax. Public hysteria
will be increased in the surrounding area. This type of dispersal scenario is completely
plausible if one imagines that a radiological weapon was detonated along with the vehicle
bombs used in the World Trade Center and the Oklahoma City Federal Building
bombings.
4. Air Dispersal
It is possible to "grind up" nuclear material so it can be dispersed in the air.
Information concerning the safe handling of hazardous materials is widely available in
open source literature. There are vast numbers of individuals throughout the world who
safely work with radionuclides everyday. Thus, the knowledge, technology, and
expertise to handle and "grind up" nuclear material is available to sub-state actors.
Many of the radionuclides that are used in civilian industry are in sealed sources
that are in small, portable containers. It will not be difficult to handle these materials
while attempting to grind them up. The hardest nuclear material to handle will be spent
nuclear fuel rods, which are highly radioactive. 95 Spent fuel rods that have been cooling
95
Information concerning the handling of spent nuclear fuel rods can be found in the following source:
W.R. Lyod, M.K. Sheaffer, and W.G. Sutcliffe, Dose Rate Estimates from Irradiated Light-Water-Reactor
Fuel Assemblies in Air, UCRL-JJD-1 15199 (Livermore: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 31
January 1994).
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for fifteen years or longer can safely be handled without receiving a lethal dose (LD50)96
of450 rem if handled from a distance greater than one meter. 97 Handling spent fuel rods
requires specific knowledge and expertise so as not to substantially irradiate the
individuals handling the material; however, terrorists may not be concerned with the
health hazards involved in handling the spent fuel rods.
a. Aerial Vehicles
Ground up nuclear material can be dispersed by aerial vehicles. The
amount of material to be dispersed is determined by the size of the vehicle needed to
carry out the terrorist act. Two common vehicles that can be used are radio controlled
planes and crop dusters. Radio controlled planes are very common and can be purchased
for a few thousand dollars. 98 These planes can be purchased with nine foot wingspans
and the ability to travel one hundred and fifty miles per hour. 99 Many of these planes can
carry payloads and smoke emitting devices. It would be feasible for these small radio
controlled planes, which are similar to military unmanned aerial vehicle in size and ability,
to be used to disperse nuclear material over a region.
96
The definition ofLD50 is that if each person within a given population received a specified dose, at least
fifty percent would die from the exposure.
97,
Lyod, Sheaffer, and Sutcliffe, Dose Rate Estimates, 1.
98
Radio controlled plane competitions are quickly becoming the new hobbies for aerial enthusiasts around
the world.
99
"Radio-Controlled Airplane Races on Until Tomorrow," Monterey County Herald, 10 February 1996,
CI.
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Terrorists can ruin a season's food crop on the scale that occurred
following the Chernobyl disaster if they used a crop duster or radio controlled plane to
spread nuclear material over a farming region. The contaminated crops will most likely
rot before people would purchase the contaminated food. Knowingly ingesting
radionuclides is contrary to society's nuclear phobia, fear of the unknown, and perception
of cancer. Simultaneous contamination of several farming regions will devastate a
country's food supplies and hurt their economy, which could be a very valuable
bargaining tool for terrorists. 100 Public outcry combined with the farmers' demands for
compensation will require the government to either meet the terrorist demands or retaliate
against the terrorist organization. Either way, the target country would suffer.
b. Ventilation Systems
Dispersal by a ventilation system has the potential to contaminate a large
number of people. The building itself and its vast ventilation system ducting will be
contaminated. Clean up efforts for the building will be difficult and time consuming. The
government and the public, to some degree, will have to decide at what point the clean up
effort is complete. The building will shut down for a significant period of time.
Terrorists could disrupt entire cities by targeting key locations. These locations can range
from financial institutions to transportation centers.
100
The simultaneous contamination of several farming areas may seem improbable because of the high
degree of coordination and the number of resources that would be required to execute the plan. However,
state-sponsored sub-state actors or determined terrorist organizations could organize and carry out such a
plan. Under estimating a terrorist organization may leave a country vulnerable to terrorist attacks.
68
5. Water Dispersal
Dispersal of radionuclides in water supplies has been a scenario that has been
exacerbated by the media since the first reports of fissile material smuggling from the New
Republics of the Former Soviet Union. The typical claim is that only a few ounces of
plutonium would kill thousands of people if it was dispersed in a city's water supply.
These claims are simply not true. It will require tons of plutonium to get a kilogram of
plutonium to stay suspended in a water supply. The dose received by drinking this
contaminated water will be less than the annual dose received from natural background
radiation.
101
Thus, this type of scenario will not only be logistically infeasible for
terrorists to carry out, but it will not meet the criteria of having a dose greater than
i
background radiation.
The criteria could be met by dispersing radionuclides in a small water supplies,
such as five gallon water coolers that are common place in today's society. Terrorists can
place small amounts of radionuclides in the water bottles and disperse them throughout a
city. The terrorist act will have the appearance ofbeing wide spread and effecting a large
number of people. Only a small amount of nuclear material is needed to set off geiger
counters as emergency crews began the tedious task of determining the extent ofthe
contamination. Public distrust, their perception of the risks involved, and nuclear phobia
will all determine the level of public response and demand for government action.
101 A summary of the dangers of plutonium in water supplies can be found in Sutcliffe, Condit, Mansfield,
Myers, Layton, and Murphy, A Perspective on the Dangers of Plutonium, 7-14.
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D. COMBINED RADIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL DISPERSAL SCENARIOS
A unique combination of weapons of mass destruction terrorism is to combine
radiological weapons with chemical weapons. This combination will yield devastating
effects and complicate the government's response to the terrorist threat. The radiological
weapon will allow terrorists to tap into society's nuclear phobia, while the chemical
weapon will produce the immediate health effects that will reinforce the nuclear phobia
and undermine the government's attempts to dispel fears and health risks. Two scenarios
using the combination of radiological and chemical weapons. The first scenario involves
the aerial dispersal of a radiological weapon along with a cancer causing chemical weapon.
The second scenario is to disperse radionuclides in water supplies with an emetic
chemical.
1. Air Dispersal of a Combined Weapon
A combined aerial weapon can be a weapon that combines radionuclides and
aflatoxin. Aflatoxin is a toxin that will cause cancer within five to ten years of exposure.
The knowledge ofhow to produce aflatoxin is available throughout the world. In fact,
Iraq had produced large quantities of aflatoxin, which were weaponized as part of its
extensive chemical weapons program. 102 Since aflatoxin is a chemical, it can easily be
dispersed from an aerial spray tank. A crop duster, carrying radionuclides in powdered
102
Kathleen Bailey, "Deterring the Use of Weapons ofMass Destruction" Lecture given at the Naval
Postgraduate School on 19 March 1996.
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form and spray tanks of aflatoxin, could be used to disperse the combined weapon over a
crop region or a city. The radionuclides will play upon the public's nuclear phobia, while
the aflatoxin will produce real cancer causing health effects to a large number of people.
Chemical weapons and radiological weapons are complementary when used in this type
of dispersal scenario.
2. Water Dispersal of a Combined Weapon
Radiological weapons and chemical weapons are not only complementary for air
dispersal, but also for water dispersal. Millions of families around the world have syrup
of ipecac in their medicine cabinets. Syrup of ipecac is an emetic commonly used to
induce vomiting when young children have ingested a poison. Ingestion of a small
quantity of syrup of ipecac, such as a tablespoon, will induce vomiting. Ingestion of
larger quantities will produce violent vomiting.
Combining a small quantity of radionuclides with syrup of ipecac into a water
cooler size water supply is a plausible scenario. 104 The quantity of radionuclides will
only have to be large enough to set off a geiger counter. The nuclear material will trigger
the nuclear phobia, while the syrup of ipecac will induce vomiting. The vomiting will be
associated with vomiting caused by radiation poisoning. The immediate chemical effects
will be associated with the nuclear material and increase the public's fear and reactions.
104
The use of syrup of ipecac in a water dispersal scenario was developed by the author in conjunction with
Bill Scott, Department of Energy, Idaho Falls, Idaho, November 1995.
71
E. SUMMARY
Radiological weapons are superb psychological terror weapons that can
complement the psychological aspects of terrorism. Radiological weapons induce more
widespread fear and long lasting public panic than conventional weapons, with minimum
risk to their personnel and organization. These weapons allow terrorist organizations to
operate on the threshold that separates acts of violence from being ineffective in attaining
their goals and from being overly devastating so that internal and external support for
their cause is lost.
The first widely publicized act of radiological terrorism accomplished three
objectives. First, it demonstrated the accessibility of nuclear material to terrorists.
Second, the act demonstrated one aspect ofhow radiological weapons can be employed.
Finally, it provided a scenario for other sub-state actors to draw lessons learned and
improve future dispersal scenarios.
Many of the dispersal scenarios that can be employed by terrorists can not be
effectively deterred, only effective responses to the acts of violence can be prepared. To
effectively prepare for all of the possible contingencies, response teams and supporting
agencies, such as the intelligence community, must understand likely scenarios to be
employed by terrorists. Scenarios must allow a terrorist organization to effectively
contaminate a group of people with either a dose equal to or greater than the annual
permissible dose allowed by U.S. law or a dose sufficient enough to induce nuclear phobia
among the general public. The scenarios need to depict the ability ofthe terrorist
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organization to strike anywhere and anytime. The appearance must be that no one is
safe. All of the scenarios that were discussed in this chapter meet the aforementioned
criteria. Governments throughout the world must be prepared to deal with scenarios
ranging from nuclear reactor sabotage to contaminated water supplies.
The hardest scenarios to effectively prepare for are the scenarios involving
combined weapons of mass destruction. The combination of chemical weapons with
radiological weapons will complicate the government response to the terrorist act, medical
assistance to the victims, and the environmental clean up. These challenges are not
insurmountable obstacles, but they must be comprehensively examined to ensure a
coordinated and effective response to minimize injury and damage. These issues must be
examined from the national level down to the local levels. The weakest part of the





The findings of this thesis are not meant to be alarmist; yet the possibility of
terrorists using radiological weapons can not be ignored.. This thesis is a vulnerability
assessment concerning radiological weapons and terrorism. The findings of this thesis can
be incorporated in the present U.S. resource allocation towards deterring and countering
WMD terrorism.
1. New Concern Over Radiological Weapons
The United States is committed to deterring WMD and the terrorist organizations
who may be determined to use WMD. The U.S. threat analysis on WMD terrorism must
be expanded to include radiological terrorism. Radiological weapons are the niche between
conventional weapons and true WMD. These weapons can produce contamination and
fear that is conducive to terrorist objectives.
2. Radiological Weapons Produce Contamination and Fear
Nuclear phobia is well established in the United States and in many societies
throughout the world. Nuclear power accidents reinforce the public's fear ofthe atom.
The nuclear fear gives credibility to the psychological aspect of radiological weapons.
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Sub-clinical effects from ionizing radiation will not immediately produce a
significant number of deaths. However, sub-clinical effects are enough for terrorists to
tap into the public's nuclear fear. Resulting hysteria will generate a considerable amount
of public pressure upon a government. Governments must resist this pressure and not
give in to the terrorist demands.
3. Nuclear Material is Accessible: Abundant and Under Minimum Physical
Security
Radiological weapons use nuclear material that is abundant throughout the world:
medical facilities, agriculture, commercial industry, and defense. These radionuclides are
under a spectrum of physical security systems. The spectrum ranges from extremely
tight physical controls to questionable security measures. Superpowers, such as the
United States and the Russian Federation, are not immune from theft and diversion. The
CIS can be considered as the number one source for the illicit transfer of nuclear materials.
4. Radiological Weapons Complement Terrorism
Radiological weapons are superb psychological terror weapons that can
complement the psychological aspects of terrorism. Radiological weapons induce more
widespread fear and long lasting public panic than conventional weapons, with minimum
risk to their personnel and organization. These weapons allow terrorist organizations to
operate on the threshold that separates acts of violence from being ineffective in attaining
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their goals and from being overly devastating so that internal and external support for
their cause is lost.
5. Limitless Radiological Dispersal Scenarios
To effectively prepare for all of the possible contingencies, response teams and
supporting agencies, such as the intelligence community, must understand the most likely
scenarios to be employed by terrorists. The hardest scenarios to effectively prepare for
and respond to are those involving the combination of true WMD with radiological
weapons. This combination will complicate the government response to the terrorist act,
medical assistance to the victims, and the environmental clean up.
B. IMPLICATIONS TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
The findings of this thesis have implications to the U.S. intelligence community.
Intelligence plays a vital role in the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
countering terrorism. The intelligence community is essential in assessing the threat
posed by radiological terrorism and the U.S. vulnerability to it. Intelligence efforts can be
divided into four categories: indications and warning, collection, intelligence cooperation,
and lead agency. Improvements in these four categories will increase the U.S. efforts to
deter, counter, and respond to radiological threats.
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1. Indications and Warning
The indications and warnings discussed in this section are by no means a
comprehensive list of indicators to signal that a terrorist organization has the predilection
to use weapons of mass destruction. It is a list of indications and warning for those
organizations that may be involved in radiological terrorism. The indication and warnings
can be divided into five areas: brain trust, education, views, technology investment, and
tactics.
The first two indicators, brain trust and education, must be discussed together.
The brain trust is a group of individuals with similar educational backgrounds.
Radiological weapons are technical weapons. The terrorist organizations need individuals
with the requisite backgrounds to locate the nuclear material, safely handle the material,
and assemble a weapon that fits the desired dispersal method. The technical brain trust
may consist of engineers, physicists, chemists, radiology technicians, nuclear power plant
workers, or workers specializing in the waste management of discarded nuclear material.
These types of individuals will have the required knowledge on how to locate
radionuclides without drawing suspicion to their activities and will have the knowledge on
how to handle and transport the material with minimal. 104
If no brain trust exists or if one needs to be expanded, then one of the easiest ways
to accomplish the brain trust is through education. Organizations may encourage or fund
members to obtain the required technical backgrounds required for radiological weapons.
104
Decreasing the risk of exposing individuals of the terrorist organization to the negative health effects of
nuclear material increases the attractiveness of radiological weapons. Organizations will not need
individuals willing to sacrifice themselves in assembling, transporting, or detonating the device.
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One must remember that crude radiological weapons require a very minimal technical
background, if any, to assemble and detonate. Monitoring the types of educational
backgrounds that known or suspected sub-state actors may have or be receiving will
indicate the degree of capability and sophistication of the organization in carrying out
radiological terrorism.
The third indicator is terrorist views. Organizations that border on or use
apocalyptic views, such as religious fundamentalists or supremacists, in their literature
and rhetoric are excellent candidates not only for using radiological weapons, but all
weapons of mass destruction. These organizations may be the most dangerous because of
the willingness to sacrifice members of the group in carrying out the terrorist act. Self
sacrifice can be used to eliminate the need for a terrorist to have a technical background
when dealing with radiological terrorism. If apocalyptic groups begin to use any type of
WMD, then other terrorist organizations may have to turn to WMD terrorism to gain the
media coverage they desire. Non-apocalyptic groups will desire to use minimum violence
with the perception of possessing the capability to conduct widespread death and
destruction; therefore, they may turn to radiological terrorism.
The fourth indicator is the investment in radionuclide industries. Organizations
that legally own industries that use nuclear material can obtain or divert radionuclides for
the purpose of producing radiological weapons. An unknown diversion of material is
possible because of the lack of transparency in verification and accountability and
inadequate security in radionuclide industries throughout the world. The ease of obtaining
nuclear material is particularly true when referring to state-sponsored terrorism. Foreign
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countries could support or otherwise encourage terrorist organizations to use radiological
weapons against the United States and its vital national interests. The ability to monitor
radionuclides in foreign countries is far more difficult when those countries have little or
no regulations or intent to regulate and closely monitor commercial radionuclide
applications.
The final warning sign is tactics. Tactics involves the methods, types of weapons,
and risk. Terrorists that are sophisticated in their methods and weapons may eventually
innovate to WMD terrorism. Any group that is willing to take large risks and has a higher
degree of commitment to their objectives than to personal safety are more inclined to use
WMD to obtain their objectives. A high degree of risk taking usually equates to vicious
attacks with a high number of causalities. 105 A small amount ofWMD can either produce
or give the appearance of possessing the capability to produce a large number of
causalities.
The five indications and warnings discussed in this section can be added to the
present data bases and watch lists used by the intelligence and law enforcement agencies
responsible for countering terrorism. These indicators may not spotlight an unknown and
determined terrorist. They will provide an excellent indication of terrorist organizations
that presently have or are trying to obtain the ability to produce and employ radiological
weapons.
105
Tactics for possible WMD use were compiled from the following sources: Ron Purver, Strategic
Analyst, Chemical and Biological Terrorism: The Threat According to the Open Literature (Canada:
Canadian Security Intelligence Service, June 1995), 49-51 and U.S. Congress, Office of Technology
Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, OTA-BP-ISC-115 (Washington:
U.S. Printing Office, December 1993).
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2. Intelligence Collection
a. Human Intelligence (HUMINT)
Human intelligence can provide access to sub-state actors that are critical
in countering radiological terrorism. HUMINT can not only possibly provide a terrorist
organization's intentions or cue additional collection assets, but it could also possibly
provide a higher degree ofunderstanding that might be unavailable in technical collection
sources. This understanding includes radiological stockpiles, facilities, hardware,
dispersal methods, material samples, supply sources, and brain trust. 106
Non-official cover agents can provide the greatest amount of information
concerning the non-proliferation of radiological weapons and terrorism. The proper use
ofNOCs will allow the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to de-emphasize the reliance
on foreign nationals and third country nationals to gather intelligence in countries of
interest. This will require "new people, new methods, and new technology." 107
The CIA needs to expand its NOC program into areas, such as "energy
companies, import-export firms, banks with foreign branches and high-tech
corporations," 108 nuclear power industry, nuclear waste reprocessing facilities, arms
industry, arms control and disarmament verification, international inspection teams,
106
Jeffrey T. Richelson, "Can the Intelligence Community Keep Pace with the Threat?" eds. Mitchell
Reiss and Robert S. Litwak, Nuclear Proliferation After the Cold War (Washington: Woodrow Wilson
Center Press, 1994), 296.
107
Angelo Codevilla, "The CIA's Identity Crisis: How Central is Central Intelligence?" American
Enterprise, Vol. 3 No. 1, Jan-Feb 1992, 30.
108
Elaine Shannon and Douglas Waller, "Spies for the New Disorder," Time. Vol. 145 No. 7, 20 February
1995, 29.
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multilateral science organizations, medical industry, journalism, clergy, and academia.
This vast network of non-official cover agents will complement the access available to
official cover and overt agents. The intelligence gathered by HUMINT agents will
increase the all source collection that is required to counter radiological weapons and
terrorism.
b. Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)
Electronic media, databases, libraries, on-line services, and the internet are
all open sources that are available to terrorist organizations. There is a tremendous wealth
of technical knowledge available from these open sources. An individual can access
information on how to produce crude bombs, chemical agents, handle hazardous material,
technical manuals, and information concerning terrorism.
Technical information and points of contact concerning any aspect of
radiological weapons can be obtained by electronic mail from anywhere in the world. The
internet and electronic mail links the world into a single information sphere. "The
information revolution has dramatically increased both the quantity and quality of the
information available." 110 A terrorist organization can expand its brain trust by simply
"surfing the internet" or by electronically corresponding to an individual, who could be
located across the globe. The amount of information and ease of accessibility will only
increase in the twenty-first century. Maximizing OSINT will benefit analysis,
10
Robert D. Steele, "The Importance of Open Source Intelligence to the Military," Intelligence and
Counterintelligence, Vol. 8, No. 4, Winter 1995, 464.
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operational planning, and enable government agencies to plan effective responses to
radiological threats.
3. Intelligence Cooperation
Radiological weapons have the least transparency for verification and
acceptability in the international arena because there are no international norms or treaties
banning radiological weapons. The lack oftransparency means that it may be easier to
legally obtain or divert nuclear material than other forms ofWMD. The path of least
resistance for a terrorist organization may well be the path of least transparency.
Countering radiological terrorism may require a tremendous number ofresources and
assets. The problem of not having enough resources can be overcome by increasing
domestic and international cooperation.
Bilateral intelligence cooperation in joint efforts to counter the radiological threat
can focus on the smuggling of nuclear material, identifying clandestine radiological
programs, and terrorist organizations who train, posses, or employ radiological weapons,
supply networks, and counter-terrorism operations. International cooperation will
signify that the international community will not condone the use of radiological
weapons. Joint efforts will demonstrate the U.S. resolve in preventing the spread of
nuclear material and radiological terrorism.
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4. Lead Intelligence Agency
The lead U.S. intelligence agency for the nonproliferation ofweapons of mass
destruction is the Director of Central Intelligence's Nonproliferation Center (NPC). The
NPC is "designed to coordinate all ofthe government's intelligence efforts related to
proliferation and to serve as a single point of contact within the community." 111
Centralized tasking is essential to a coordinated and integrated effort against not only
radiological weapons, but all WMD. All source collection must maximize HUMINT,
OSINT, and international cooperation against radiological weapons.
The Nonproliferation Center has the opportunity to indicate that the United
States may be vulnerable to radiological devices ifthe U.S. continues to downplay these
weapons because they can not cause immediate widespread death and destruction. This
view point concerning radiological weapons can be changed. The NPC is at the level of
bureaucracy that can indicate to the policy makers that radiological weapons are viable
weapons for WMD terrorism and that these weapons require adequate attention.
C. AREAS FORADDITIONAL RESEARCH
There are three areas, not presented in this thesis, that require additional research.
The first area concerns the criteria for WMD terrorism. A comprehensive model, based
on tangible variables, needs to be developed to indicate whether or not a terrorist
111
Henry Sokolski, "Fighting Proliferation," eds. Roy Godson, Ernest R. May, and Gary Schmitt, U.S.
Intelligence at the Crossroads: Agendas for Reform (Washington: Brassey's, 1995), 207.
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organization has the predilection to use weapons of mass destruction. This model must
provide indicators for all WMD and identify a threshold that can be monitored. The
threshold will indicate when the organization has determined that conventional weapons
are no longer adequate and that WMD is required to obtain their goals.
The second area is open source collection for the intelligence community. The
intelligence community must know exactly what is available from open sources,
particularly on-line electronic databases, such as the internet. If the intelligence
community does not have comprehensive knowledge of the types of information that is
available to terrorists, then a complete and accurate analysis can not be formulated. This
thesis is an initial attempt to provide an open source analysis on radiological terrorism.
The final area for additional research is to develop realistic radiological terrorism
scenarios that address both the technical aspects of radiological weapons and the
psychological terror that is generated by a radiological terrorist act. These scenarios must
be rehearsed at all levels ofgovernment. Rehearsed scenarios will identify problems in
coordination, resource allocation, preparedness, and response times. Overcoming the




APPENDIX: NUCLEAR REACTOR INDUSTRIES OF THE WORLD
Tables eight through twelve summarize the extent of the nuclear reactor industry
in the world today. The shaded countries indicate that the country has the technology
and at least a pilot program for enriching uranium or processing plutonium. It is these
countries that are the concern of the present nonproliferation regime because these
programs can be expanded to produce nuclear weapons. Yet, it is the myriad number of
unshaded countries that are of particular concern to thhis thesis because it is these
countries that have an abundance of radionuclides that could be used to produce
radiological weapons.
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Argentina 2 : Enrichment 6
Brazil 1 Enrichment 4




Mexico 2 None 1
Peru None 3
United States 109 Enrichment &
Reprocessing
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Total for Region 136 N/A 102
Sources: Adapted from Nuclear Research Reactors in the World, Reference Data Series
No. 3 (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, December 1994); Nuclear Power
Reactors in the World , Reference Data Series No. 2 (Vienna: International Atomic Energy
Agency, April 1995); Leonard S. Spector, Mark G. McDonough, and Evan S. Medeiros,
Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A guide in Maps and Charts, 1995 (Washington: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 1995); Thomas B. Cochran, William M. Arkin,
Robert S. Norris, and Milton M. Hoenig, Nuclear Weapons DataBook: Volume III, U.S.
Nuclear Warhead Facility Profiles (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1987);
Thomas B. Cochran, William M. Arkin, Robert S. Norris, and Milton M. Hoenig, Nuclear
Weapons DataBook: Volume II, U.S. Nuclear Warhead Production (Cambridge: Ballinger
Publishing Company, 1987); and U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,
Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, OTA-BP-ISC-115
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1993).
1
The category "Fissile Material Production Facilities" refers to a country having at least one of the
following. (1) pilot plant for uranium enrichment, (2) industrial capability for uranium enrichment, (3) pilot
program for plutonium reprocessing, or (4) large scale plutonium reprocessing program.
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Belgium 7 None 4
Denmark None 2






Germany 21 Enrichment 21
Greece None 1
.
Italy i 6 ': v;..::.. Enrichment 5




Sweden 12 None 2
Switzerland 5 None 3
Umt&S Kingdom 34 . Enrichment &
Reprocessing
9
Total for Region 150 N/A 75
Sources: Adapted from Nuclear Research Reactors in the World , Reference Data Series
No. 3 (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, December 1994); Nuclear Power
Reactors in the World
,
Reference Data Series No. 2 (Vienna: International Atomic Energy
Agency, April 1995); Leonard S. Spector, Mark G. McDonough, and Evan S. Medeiros,
Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A guide in Maps and Charts, 1995 (Washington: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 1995), Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, and
Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook: Volume V: British, French, and
Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994); and U.S. Congress, Office of
Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, OTA-
BP-ISC-1 15 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1993).
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Bulgaria 6 None 1
Czech Republic 4 None 3
Hungary 4 None 2










Slovak Republic 4 None
Slovenia 1 None 1
Ukraine 9 Enrichment 3
Uzbekistan None 1
Former Yugoslavia None 2
Total for Region 60 N/A 59
Sources: Adapted from Nuclear Research Reactors in the World , Reference Data Series
No. 3 (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, December 1994); Nuclear Power
Reactors in the World , Reference Data Series No. 2 (Vienna: International Atomic Energy
Agency, April 1995); U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to the Honorable Bob
Graham, U.S. Senate, Nuclear Safety: Concerns With Nuclear Facilities and Other Sources
of Radiation in the Former Soviet Union (GAO/RCED-96-4, 07 November 1995);
Leonard S. Spector, Mark G. McDonough, and Evan S. Medeiros, Tracking Nuclear
Proliferation: A guide in Maps and Charts, 1995 (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 1995), and U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,
Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction , OTA-BP-ISC-115
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1993).
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South Africa 2 Enrichment 1
Zaire None 1
Total for Region 2 N/A 11
Sources: Adapted from Nuclear Research Reactors in the World , Reference Data Series
No. 3 (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, December 1994); Nuclear Power
Reactors in the World , Reference Data Series No. 2 (Vienna: International Atomic Energy
Agency, April 1995); Leonard S. Spector, Mark G. McDonough, and Evan S. Medeiros,
Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A guide in Maps and Charts, 1995 (Washington: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 1995); and U.S. Congress, Office ofTechnology
Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, OTA-BP-ISC-115
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1993).
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Japan 49 Enrichment &
Reprocessing
19
North Korea 1 None 1
South Korea None 4
Malaysia None 1







Total for Region 63 N/A 55
Sources: Adapted from Nuclear Research Reactors in the World , Reference Data Series
No. 3 (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, December 1994); Nuclear Power
Reactors in the World , Reference Data Series No. 2 (Vienna: International Atomic Energy
Agency, April 1995); Leonard S. Spector, Mark G. McDonough, and Evan S. Medeiros,
Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A guide in Maps and Charts, 1995 (Washington: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 1995); Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, and
Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook: Volume V: British, French, and
Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994); and U.S. Congress, Office of
Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction , OTA-
BP-ISC-1 15 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1993).
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